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Court-Martial Jurisdiction Over Servicemen
for "Civilian" Offenses: An Analysis
of O'Callahan v. Parker
Grant S. Nelson*
James E. Westbrook**
I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Code of Military Justice,' enacted by Con-
gress in 1951, provided military courts-martial with broad juris-
diction over military personnel 2 and over civilians employed by
or accompanying the armed forces outside the United States.3
In the decade after enactment, several controversial and divided
Supreme Court opinions, based on constitutional principles,
sounded the death knell for peacetime military jurisdiction over
civilians.4 These decisions have generated a plethora of valu-
able commentary.5 On the other hand, relatively few doubts
have been raised either by courts or scholars concerning the
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan;
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
** Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964). Congressional enactment was
based on Article I, § 8, clause 14, which gives Congress the power to
"make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval forces" and, to some extent, on the fifth amendment of the
United States Constitution, which specifically exempts "cases arising in
the land and naval forces or in the militia, when in actual service in
time of war or public danger" from the requirement of prosecution by
indictment. See text accompanying notes 24-28 infra.
2. Uniform Code of Military Justice, art. 2(1), 10 U.S.C. § 802
(1) (1964) [hereinafter cited as UCMJ]. See text accompanying notes
115-17 infra.
3. UCMJ art. 2(11), 10 U.S.C. § 802 (11) (1964).
4. The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, 74 HAnv. L. REv. 81, 116
(1960). Specifically, the Court struck down peacetime court-martialjurisdiction in both capital and noncapital cases over overseas civilian
dependents of military personnel and civilian employees of the mili-
tary. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (dependent charged with
capital offense); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S.
234 (1960) (dependent charged with noncapital felony); Grisham v.
Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (civilian government employee charged
with capital offense); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo,
361 U.S. 281 (1960) (civilian government employee charged with
noncapital felony). See further discussion of these cases in text accom-
panying notes 126-38 infra.
5. See, e.g., Ehrenhaft, Policing Civilians Accompanying the
United States Armed Forces Overseas; Can United States Commission-
ers Fill the Jurisdictional Gap? 36 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 273 (1967);
Everett, Military Jurisdiction Over Civilians, 1960 DuxE L.J. 366;
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constitutionality of the broad court-martial jurisdiction con-
ferred on the military by Congress over members of the armed
forces or, in particular, the power of the military to try its own
personnel for so-called "civilian" offenses.8 One senses an im-
plicit assumption on the part of most of the courts and legal
scholars during this period that the military status of an accused
automatically conferred court-martial jurisdiction.7 This "hands
off" attitude is best exemplified by the 1962 statement of Chief
Justice Warren that:
[T]he tradition of our country, from the time of the Revolution
until now, has supported the military establishment's broad
power to deal with its own personnel for the most obvious
reason ... that courts are ill-equipped to determine the impact
upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military
authority might have.8
The judicial philosophy reflected in the above statement was,
however, assaulted and seriously jeopardized this year by the
Supreme Court in O'Callahan v. Parker,9 and Chief Justice War-
ren was among those leading the assault. In that case the
petitioner, an army sergeant stationed in Hawaii in July, 1956,
while off duty and off post, and in civilian clothes, broke into
the hotel room of a 14-year-old tourist and attempted to rape
her. He was charged with attempted rape, housebreaking, and
assault with attempt to rape,10 and was tried and convicted by
a general court martial on all counts.11 The conviction was
Everett, Persons Who Can Be Tried By Court-Martial, 5 J. PuB. L.
148 (1956); Girard, The Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians
Accompanying the Armed Forces-A Preliminary Analysis, 13 STAN.
L. REv. 461 (1960).
6. The notable exception was Duke & Vogel, The Constitution
and the Standing Army: Another Problem of Court-Martial Juris-
diction, 13 VAz. L. REv. 435 (1960). See also Bishop, Court-Martial
Jurisdiction Over Military-Civilian Hybrids: Retired Regulars, Re-
servists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 317 (1964);
Hearings on S. Res. 260 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 563, 571
(1962) (testimony of A. Kenneth Pye); Blair, Court-Martial Juris-
diction Over Retired Regulars: An Unwarranted Extension of Military
Power, 50 Gao. L.J. 79, 103 (1961).
7. See, e.g., L FoRxosc, CoNsrrTImoNAL LAw 355 (1969). J.
Moons, FEDERAL PRAcTicE 0.5[3.-4] at 149 (1964); Everett, Persons
Who Can Be Tried By Court-Martial, 5 J. PuB. L. 148 (1956); Girard,
supra note 5; Orfield, Indictment and Information in Federal Procedure,
13 SY. L. REv. 14, 33 (1961). See text accompanying notes 131-38
infra.
8. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, S7 N.Y.U.L. REV.
181, 187 (1962).
9. 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
10. See UCMJ arts. 80, 130, 134, 10 U.S.C. §§ 880, 930, 934 (1964).
11. Petitioner was sentenced to 10 years imprisonment at hard
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reviewed and affirmed by an Army Board of Review and the
United States Court of Military Appeals. 12 While imprisoned
in a federal facility, petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus
in the United States District Court for the Middle District of
Pennsylvania, alleging that the court-martial lacked jurisdiction
to try him for non-military offenses committed off-post while on
leave. The District Court refused relief without discussion of
the jurisdictional issue'3 and the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed in an opinion by Chief Judge I-astie which only briefly
touched upon the jurisdictional issue.14 The United States Su-
preme Court, on certiorari, reversed the Court of Appeals five
to three and ruled that the court-martial had no jurisdiction to
try the petitioner under the facts of the case. Justice Douglas
wrote for the majority and was joined by Justices Warren,
Brennan, Marshall and Black.
Although the Douglas opinion is full of troublesome and
often gratuitous comments on military justice, the superiority
of civilian trials, legal history and recent Supreme Court
opinions, these matters are better considered elsewhere in the
article. Briefly, the majority rejected the argument of the gov-
ernment that military "status" was the sole prerequisite to
court-martial jurisdiction over members of the armed forces
and stated instead that "status" was "merely the beginning of
the inquiry, not its end."' 5 The majority buttressed this deter-
mination in part by its observations that both English and Amer-
ican history revealed a suspicion of military trials for soldiers
committing "civilian offenses" and that the founding fathers
labor, forfeiture of all pay and allowances and dishonorable discharge.
A maximum sentence of 25 years would have been permissible.
12. After serving approximately four years of the sentence, the
petitioner was paroled by federal authorities. Two years later, in
1962, the petitioner was cited for a parole violation. While on parole he
apparently was sentenced by a Massachusetts state court and confined
in a Massachusetts penal facility. See O'Callahan v. Attorney General
of the United States, 230 F. Supp. 766 (D. Mass. 1964). Ultimately, he
was returned to federal custody. For a complete chronology of petition-
er's litigative history during the past decade see O'Callahan v. United
States, 293 F. Supp. 122 (D. Minn. 1968).
13. United States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 256 F. Supp. 679
(M.D. Pa. 1966). The District Judge relied on an opinion of Chief
Judge Wyzanski on the jurisdictional issue in an earlier habeas corpus
action by the petitioner. See O'Callahan v. Chief United States Marshal,
293 F. Supp. 441 (D. Mass. 1966).
14. United States ex rel. O'Callahan v. Parker, 390 F.2d 360 (3d
Cir. 1968). Judge Hastie, in deciding the jurisdictional issue, referred
to a short discussion in the Third Circuit case of Thompson v. Willing-
ham, 318 F.2d 657 (3d Cir. 1963).
15. 395 U.S. at 267.
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expected that non-military offenses would be tried in civil
courts. 16 Thus, the majority held, not only must military status
be present, but it must be shown that the offense is
service connected lest "cases arising in the land or naval forces
or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public
danger," as used in the Fifth Amendment, be expanded to de-
prive every member of the armed services of the benefits of an
indictment by a grand jury and a trial by a jury of his peers.17
The majority further maintained that there was not the re-
motest connection between petitioner's military duties and the
crimes in question, emphasizing that the offenses were com-
mitted off post, in peacetime, against a person having no re-
lationship to the military, in an area where civil courts were
open, within American territorial limits and did not involve "the
flouting of military authority, the security of a military post,
or the integrity of military property." 8
Justice Harlan, in a strongly worded dissenting opinion
joined by Justices White and Stewart, accused the majority of
throwing the law into a "demoralizing state of uncertainty" 1 9
and proceeded to excoriate the majority on several other grounds.
First, according to Justice Harlan, the Court had in the past con-
sistently asserted that military status was a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction. 20
Second, Justice Harlan argued that the historical data referred
to by the majority opinion provided "scant" support for the ma-
jority's conclusion and, if anything, supported broad military
jurisdiction over "civilian" crimes. 2' Moreover, Justice Harlan
maintained that the majority failed, in any event, to consider
"strong and legitimate governmental interests" which support the
exercise of court-martial jurisdiction over even non-military
crimes. Scoring the majority's "ad hoe" approach, he concluded
by asserting that "[a] bsolutely nothing in the language, history,
or logic of the Constitution justifies this uneasy state of affairs
which the Court has today created.122
This article will evaluate the majority and dissenting opin-
ions. The validity of each opinion's reliance on the text of the
Constitution and on English and American constitutional history
will be emphasized. The variety of the possible interpretations
16. Id. at 268-72.
17. Id. at 272-73.
18. Id. at 273-74.
19. Id. at 275.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 276.
22. Id. at 281-84.
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of the Court's "service-connected" test for determining jurisdic-
tion over servicemen will be discussed, as will the problems in-
herent in applying such a standard. A multi-factor approach to
determine which offenses are "service-connected" will be pro-
posed. Finally, a number of collateral problems raised by the
decision, such as retroactivity, a "petty offense" exception and
the exhaustion of remedies doctrine will be analyzed.
II. THE TEXT OF THE CONSTITUTION
A detailed examination of O'Callahan should begin with an
examination of the text of the Constitution, for the Court has
said many times that collateral aids to construction are unneces-
sary if the language of the Constitution is clear.23 Four provi-
sions of the Constitution are relevant: (1) Article I, section 8,
clause 14 empowers Congress: "To make Rules for the Govern-
ment and Regulation of the land and naval forces. . . ."; Section
8 concludes by authorizing Congress: "To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers,...,,24
(2) Article III, section 2, declares:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State
where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when
not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such
Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
(3) The fifth amendment provides that:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger;.. 25
(4) The sixth amendment states that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
23. ten Broeck, Admissibility and Use by the United States Su-
preme Court of Extrinsic Aids in Constitutional Construction, 26 CALIU.
L. REv. 287, 290 (1938). See, e.g., United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S.
716, 730-32 (1931); McPherson v. Blocker, 146 U.S. 1, 11 (1892); Ogden
v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 302 (1827).
24. In Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), Justice Black argued that
"having run up against the steadfast bulwark of the Bill of Rights, the
Necessary and Proper Clause cannot extend the scope of Clause 14."
354 U.S. at 21. This proposition was challenged by Justice Harlan in a
concurring opinion. 354 U.S. at 67, 71.
25. It was decided at an early date that the phrase "when in actual
service in time of war or public danger" modified only "Militia." John-
son v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 114 (1895). Thus, indictment by grand jury
is never necessary "in cases arising in the land or naval forces." See
395 U.S. at 272 n.18 (1969).
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to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, ....
Clause 14 is the source of congressional power to establish a spe-
cial system of military courts. Although the fifth amendment
exception for cases arising in the land or naval forces is the only
reference in the Bill of Rights to military justice, it is clear that
the clause "when in actual service. . ." modifies only "Militia"28
and that neither the requirement of grand jury indictment nor
right to trial by jury is applicable in trials by courts-martial.2 7
Standing alone, article I, section 8, clause 14, can be con-
strued as empowering Congress to subject all persons in the
armed forces to court-martial at all times. In his dissenting
opinion, Justice Harlan asserted that the clear meaning of this
provision was that "given the requisite military status, it is for
Congress and not the Judiciary to determine the appropriate
subject-matter jurisdiction of courts-martial." 28  The majority
believed, however, that clause 14 did not provide a clear answer
when considered in connection with the requirements of indict-
ment by grand jury and trial by jury found in article III, section
2 and the fifth and sixth amendments. Justice Douglas pur-
ported to harmonize the express grant of power to Congress with
the express guarantees of the Bill of Rights. In doing so he
placed heavy reliance upon English constitutional history prior
to the American Revolution and upon our own national history.
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION
A. ENGLISH CoNsTITUTIoNAL HISTORY
Justice Douglas began his discussion of English and Ameri-
can history by asserting that:
Both in England prior to the American Revolution and in our
own national history military trial of soldiers committing
civilian offenses has been viewed with suspicion. Abuses of the
court-martial power were an important grievance of the parlia-
mentary forces in the English constitutional crises of the 17th
century.2 9
26. 395 U.S. at 272 n.18; Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895);
Ex parte Mason, 105 U.S. 696 (1881).
27. Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 (1950). One com-
mentator states that this is "generally put in terms of implied ex-
ception." Weiner, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The Original
Practice II, 72 HAuv. L. REv. 266, 280 (1958).
28. 395 U.S. at 276.
29. Id. at 268.
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In his brief discussion of English constitutional history, Jus-
tice Douglas argued that the 17th century conflict between the
Crown and Parliament over the proper role of courts-martial in
the enforcement of the domestic criminal law was not merely a
dispute over what organ of government had jurisdiction. In-
stead, he suggested, it involved substantive disapproval of the
use of military courts for the trial of ordinary crimes. He bol-
stered his conclusion by pointing to the reluctance of Parliament
to expand the jurisdiction of courts-martial over soldiers com-
mitting common law crimes, and to the fact that it was the rule
in Britain at the time of the American Revolution that a soldier
could not be tried by court-martial for a civilian offense com-
mitted in Britain.30
The available evidence suggests that the common law prac-
tice was to try members of the armed forces in civilian courts
for offenses committed in peacetime in the Kingdom.31 It was
Macaulay's view that:
The common law of England knew nothing of courts-martial,
and made no distinction, in time of peace, between a soldier
and any other subject; nor could the government then venture
to ask even the most loyal parliament for a mutiny bill. A
soldier, therefore, by knocking down his colonel, incurred only
the ordinary penalties of assault and battery, and, by refusing
to obey orders, by sleeping on guard, or by deserting his
colours, incurred no legal penalty at all.32
On the other hand, soldiers were tried in military courts for
offenses committed in time of war, whether the war was being
waged in the Kingdom or abroad. Long before the constitutional
conflicts of the 17th century, it was accepted practice for the
Crown, relying on the royal prerogative, to issue specific direc-
tions for the government of the army during time of war.33
These ordinances were in force only during the specific expedi-
tion or war that prompted their issuance. 34 At times the Crown
issued special commissions empowering commanding generals to
30. Id. at 269. The specific example of Parliamentary reluctance
cited by Justice Douglas was the 1st Annual Mutiny Act, discussed in
the text accompanying notes 40-41 infra. The general article in the
British Articles of War in effect at the time of the American Revolution
quoted in the text accompanying note 60 infra, could have been used
to punish for non-military offenses. See text accompanying note 60
infra.
31. See F. MAITLAND, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND
325 (Fisher ed. 1908); Bishop, supra note 6, at 321-23.
32. 1 I. MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 231 (1874 ed.).
33. See generally W. WINTmRop, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS
18, 19 (1895, reprinted 1920); Duke & Vogel, supra note 6, at 441.
34. Ordinances issued by Richard I and Richard II are reproduced
in the Appendix of W. WINTHRoP, supra note 33, at 903-04.
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make rules for the government of the armies.3 5 Although sol-
diers were occasionally subjected to military jurisdiction in time
of peace on the basis of commissions issued under the royal pre-
rogative3 6 or even in the absence of a commission,3 7 such pro-
ceedings probably were illegal3 s and did not represent the cus-
tomary practice.3 9
Control of the army was given to Parliament by the Bill of
Rights in 1689. The original Mutiny Act, adopted in the same
year, represented the first use of this control to provide for the
punishment of military offenses.40 It affords useful insights Into
Parliament's attitude toward the army and toward military jus-
tice.41 The Act was prompted by a serious mutiny at home of a
regiment which supported the Stuarts and refused to obey the
order of William III to proceed to Holland, as well as by doubt
as to the loyalty of other regiments. Since the offenses of the
mutinous regiment were committed in the Kingdom in time of
peace, it was necessary for Parliament to authorize punishment
by courts-martial. In spite of the seriousness of the situation,
the Act provided very limited jurisdiction, punishing only mu-
tiny, sedition and desertion. The Act was limited in its operation
to about seven months. It applied only to members of the regu-
lar forces, exempting members of the militia.
The foregoing raises two important questions: Why was
Parliament reluctant to expand courts-martial jurisdiction, and
35. W. WiN THoP, szpra note 33, at 19 n.1l, collects the citations to
several such special commissions. The ordinances and special com-
missions were the forerunners of what later came to be known as the
Articles of War.
36. Id. at 19 n.18; F. MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 279.
37. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, HisTORy OF ENGLIsu LAw 577 (5th ed. 1931);
F. MAITLAND, supra note 31, at 327.
38. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 37, at 574, 575; F. MAImhA D, supra
note 31, at 267.
39. One of the grievances specified by Parliament in the Petition
of Right (1627) was the issuance by Charles I of commissions for the
enforcement of military law against soldiers and sailors in time of peace.
The Petition of Right prayed that:
bT]he foresaid commissions for proceeding by martial law maybe revoked and annulled; and that hereafter no commissions
of like nature may issue forth to any person or persons what-
soever, to be executed as aforesaid, lest by color of them any
of your Majesty's subjects be destroyed or put to death, con-
trary to the laws and franchise of the latd ....
3 Car. 1, c. 1 (1627).
40. Mutiny Act 1 W. & M., c. 5 (1689).
41. See the discussion of the circumstances surrounding the adop-
tion of the Act and its contents in W. WiTmRoP, supra note 33, at 19-20;
Bishop, supra note 31, at 322-23.
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what lessons could the framers of the United States Constitution
have derived from the English experience of this period? With
respect to the first question, the most important single factor in
molding Parliament's attitude was the fact that disputes over
the jurisdiction of courts-martial took place within the context of
a struggle between Crown and Parliament, with the army play-
ing a key role in the struggle.42 The Crown and Parliament
were constantly embroiled in controversy over military mat-
ters.43 During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Parlia-
ment frequently debated at great length the size of the standing
army.44 Its concern over the army was not unfounded. Charles
I had tried to govern through the Army; his reign was followed
by military rule under Oliver Cromwell; and James II relied
on the army in his fight against Parliament. 45  It became ever
clearer that the independence of Parliament and the liberties of
the subjects were closely related to the size of the armed forces
at the disposal of the Crown.40  Moreover, under the leadership
of men such as Sir Edward Coke, the struggle between Crown
and Parliament became in many respects a struggle between the
Crown and the common law. The assertion of common law
rights was in substance a demand for modifications of Crown
authority.47 It was natural, therefore, that the champions of
the common law would be hostile to a system of law under the
control of the Crown and the army.
Another important grievance arose from the fact that the
Tudor and Stuart monarchs sometimes subjected civilians to the
jurisdiction of military tribunals.48 The army and its system of
law were useful as a means of putting down insurrections and
42. A concise summary of the role of the army in this period can
be found in T. TASWELL-LAxNMEAD, ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL ISTORY
747-55 (Plucknett 10th ed. 1946).
43. See, e.g., F. MArULAiD, supra note 31, at 326-27.
44. T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD, supra note 42, at 747.
45. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 25-26 (1956); F. MAITLAND,
supra note 31, at 326.
46. T. TASWELL-LAXGMAD, supra note 42, at 747.
47. F. MAITLANTD, supra note 31, at 271; Goebel, Constitutional
History and Constitutional Law, 38 COLum. L. REv. 555, 565 (1938).
48. Bishop, supra note 6, at 322 n.17. Actually, the precedents
for this practice can be traced back earlier. F. MAWTmD, supra note 31,
at 266, 267, states that:
Towards the end of the Wars of the Roses we find very ter-
rible powers of summary justice granted to the constable. In
1462 Edward IV empowers him to proceed in all cases of trea-
son, summarily and plainly, without noise and show of judg-
ment on simple inspection of fact. A similar patent was
granted to Lord Rivers in 1467. They show something very
like a contempt for law-the constable is to exercise powers
1969]
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preserving public order.49 Speaking of the court of the Con-
stable and Marshal, which is believed by some to be the origin of
the modern courts-martial, 0 Holdsworth observed that:
[Tihe jurisdiction of the court within the realm was limited;
but it was within the realm that the Tudors required its assist-
ance. At a time when there was no standing army a juris-
diction over soldiers was capable of being confused with a
jurisdiction over all citizens liable to serve as soldiers. On the
principle that prevention is better than cure it was plausible to
say that the jurisdiction of the court was legal, not only when
war was actually proceeding, but also at a time of merely
apprehended disturbance.5 1
Although this practice was never legally sanctioned and was de-
clared unlawful in the Petition of Right,52 it was invoked often
enough to make Parliament wary of military tribunals. 53 There
were also disputes from time to time as to who was subject to
service in the army,54 and over the billeting of troops by inn-
keepers and the public.55
It must also be recognized that in spite of Parliament's sus-
picion, court-martial jurisdiction was gradually expanded. From
the time of the adoption of the first Mutiny Act in 1689 until
the American Revolution, both the annual Mutiny Acts and the
Articles of War which Parliament authorized the Crown to pro-
mulgate increased greatly in scope.5  The early Mutiny Acts
provided for the infliction of penalties by courts-martial for any
military offense committed at home; Articles of War issued by
the Crown originally dealt with offenses committed abroad. In
1718, however, the Mutiny Act authorized the Crown to promul-
of almost unlimited extent, all statutes, ordinances, acts and
restrictions to the contrary notwithstanding.
49. See 1 W. HoLDswoRTH, supra note 37, at 575; F. MAiTLA=, supra
note 31, at 267; T. TASWELL-LANGmEAD, supra note 42, at 749.
50. W. W=nTHRoP, supra note 33, at 46. See also Duke & Vogel,
supra note 6, at 442.
51. 1 W. HOLDSwORT, supra note 37, at 575.
52. Bishop, supra note 6, at 322 n.17.
53. The question of court-martial jurisliction over civilians differs
from the question presented in O'Callahan as to jurisdiction over
individual servicemen. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1956),
for a contemporary example of the importance of the distinction.
54. F. MAiTLAND, supra note 31, at 279; T. TASWELL-LANGMEAD,
supra note 42, at 748-49.
55. F. MAITAND, supra note 31, at 325; T. TASWLL-LAxGmEAD,
supra note 42, at 751.
56. W. WnTHROP, supra note 33, at 20. F. MAiTLAND, supra note 31,
at 449-50, contains a discussion of the process by which the annual
Mutiny Acts gradually absorbed more and more of the content of the
Articles of War. The 1881 Army Act for all practical purposes merged
the Articles of War and the Mutiny Act into a single document. See
W. WNTHROP, supra note 33, at 20-21.
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gate Articles of War that would operate both within and without
the Kingdom.5v At the time of the American Revolution, the
British Articles of War of 1765 were in force. 58 In addition to
covering the usual military offenses, these articles covered some
offenses that were contrary to both military and civil law. For
example, Section XIV, Article XVI, provided that all officers
and soldiers who
shall maliciously destroy any Property whatsoever belonging to
any of our subjects, unless by Order of the then Commander in
Chief of Our Forces to annoy Rebels, or other Enemies in Arms
against Us, he or they that shall be found guilty of offending
herein, shall (besides such Penalties as they are liable to by
Law) be punished according to the Nature and Degree of the
Offence, by the Judgment of a Regimental or General Court-
martial.5 9
Section XX, Article III, usually referred to as the "general
article," provided that:
All Crimes not Capital, and all Disorders or Neglects, which
Officers and Soldiers may be guilty of, to the Prejudice of good
Order and Military Discipline, though not mentioned in the
above Articles of War, are to be taken Cognizance of by a
Court-martial, and be punished at their Discretion.60
The second of the two questions posed earlier asked what
lessons the framers of the United States Constitution could have
derived from the English experience of this period. As sug-
gested by Justice Harlan, the development of court-martial juris-
diction was only one aspect of a multi-faceted struggle between
the Crown and the military on one hand, and Parliament on
the other. Justice Harlan also pointed out that the martial
law"1 of the time was arbitrary and alien to the established
legal principles5 2 and it was thus not surprising that when
Parliament gained the authority to create peacetime court-
martial jurisdiction, it exercised the authority sparingly.63
57. W. WnqTHRop, supra note 33, at 20.
58. These Articles of War are reproduced in W. WInmHoP, supra
note 33, at 931-46.
59. Id. at 940.
60. Id. at 946.
61. The term "martial law" was used in 17th century England to
refer to what is now called "military law." Duke & Vogel, The Con-
stitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem of Court-Martial
Jurisdiction, 13 VAm. L. Rzv. 435, 443 n.35 (1960).
62. Blackstone asserted that military justice "is built upon no
settled principles, but is entirely arbitrary in its decisions, [and] is, as
Sir Matthew Hale observes, in truth and reality no law, but something
indulged rather than allowed as law." 1 BLACKSTONE, COMnVINTAmES
* 413 (1769).
63. In weighing the significance of English history in the con-
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It does not seem likely, however, that the framers could have
gone further and concluded, on the basis of this long and com-
plex struggle between the Crown and Parliament, that con-
stitutional limits should be placed on the congressional power
to prescribe the jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of
the armed forces. It seems clear only that the framers were
influenced by the English experience in deciding that military
authority should be regulated by the people acting through
Congress. This was accomplished in Article I, section 8, clause
14.
B. AiVmERICAw CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
Because the drafters of the Constitution drew heavily on
English law and tradition in fashioning American institutions,64
the seventeenth century English experience is relevant in the
construction of the Constitution. A more likely source of dis-
covery of the framers' intention in drafting clause 14,65 however,
is the American history of the constitutional period. Clause 14
was taken from Article IX of the Articles of Confederation.,,
The scope of Congress' power under clause 14 apparently was
not discussed in either the Constitutional Convention or the state
ratifying conventions.67 The delegates at the Constitutional
struction of the United States Constitution, the crucial question is how
the framers viewed the English experience. The reconstruction of his-
tory is fraught with difficulty, and the task both of reconstructing his-
tory and determining how the framers viewed this history is doubly
difficult. One commentator, in discussing the use of extrinsic aids in
the construction of the Constitution, said:
The conclusions of historians about what then prevailed are
largely inductions from a great mass of specific facts, and the
framers, if aware of these facts at all, may not have arrived
at the same generalizations as the historians. The judgments
of today concerning past periods are based on partial pictures
and incomplete data.- Certainly it cannot be assumed that facts
now apparent presented themselves in the same light and with
the same degree of force to the minds of the Convention and
to the backward looking student of another age. Things plain
to the hindsight view of retrospection may well have been
obscured to contemporary vision.
ten Broeck, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids
in Constitutional Construction, 26 CALIF. L. REv. 664, 678 (1938).
64. See Goebel, supra note 47, at 555-59.
65. See note 63 supra.
66. Article IX gave Congress the "exclusive right and power of
... making rules for the government and regulation of [the] land and
naval forces, and directing their operations." Clause 14 is set forth at
text accompanying note 24 supra.
67. 5 ELLIoTT's DEBATEs 442-45, 544-45 (2d ed. 1901); Girard, The
Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians Accompanying the Armed
Forces-A Preliminary Analysis, 13 STm. L. REv. 461, 484 (1961); M.
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and state conventions were concerned with a more pressing prob-
lem-the threat to civilian government and to political and civil
rights which some thought was implicit in the presence of a
standing army.68 While Justice Douglas did not advert to the
Constitutional Convention, the absence of debate on the mean-
ing of clause 14 was an unspoken premise in Justice Harlan's
assertion that nothing in the debates over the Constitution indi-
cated that Congress was forever to be limited to the scope of
court-martial jurisdiction existing in 17th century England:
Justice Harlan was able to find more tangible support for his
position in a statement by Alexander Hamilton in The Federal-
ist that Congress' power over the armed forces
ought to exist without limitation: Because it is impossible to
foresee or define the extent & variety of national exigencies,
or the corresponding extent & variety of the means which
may be necessary to satisfy them. 69
The sharpest disagreement between the majority and the
minority in discussing the American history of that period
was over the extent of jurisdiction exercised by American courts-
martial before, during and after the Constitutional Convention.
By examining the ideas and practices of the times it is possible
to ascertain the tacit assumptions and circumstances that con-
ditioned the words used in the Constitution.70 Thus the court-
martial practice of the period can afford insights into the mean-
ing of clause 14, especially in light of the fact that many of the
framers served in the Continental Army during the Revolution-
ary War and that some of these men helped to draft the early
Articles of War.
Articles of War to govern the army were adopted by the
Continental Congress in 1775 and 1776.71 These articles were
based on the British Articles of War with certain modifications
FAmRAD, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 329-30(1911).
68. Girard, supra note 67, at 484. Professor Girard discusses the
provisions of the Constitution that were designed to obviate these dan-
gers, and points out that in spite of these provisions, delegates to the
state ratifying conventions continued to express fear of a standing army.
Id. at 484 n.108.
69. THE FEDERALIST No. 23, (A. Hamilton) quoted in 395 U.S. at
277.
70. See ten Broeck, supra note 63.
71. The first Articles were drafted by a committee composed -of
George Washington, Philip Schuyler, Silas Deane, Thomas Cushing and
Joseph Hewes. W. WINTHROP, supra note 33, at 21. The 1776 Articles
were reported to the Congress by John Adams and Thomas Jefferson.
3 J. ADA_ s, WoRxs 68-69, 83-84 (C. Adams ed. 1865).
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copied directly from the Massachusetts Articles of War.7 2 Re-
liance on the British articles was probably due to the need to
act quickly and the Continental Congress' lack of experience in
such matters33
For present purposes the most important provisions of the
1776 Articles of War were Sections IX and X of Article I, and
the general article. Section IX instructed commanding officers
to "see justice done on" any officer or soldier guilty of "beating,
or otherwise ill-treating any person; of disturbing fairs or mar-
kets; or of committing any kind of riots to the disquieting of the
good people of the United States . . . "74 Officers who failed to
heed this injunction were themselves subject to the prescribed
punishment. Section X required the commanding officer to de-
liver over to civil magistrates any officer or soldier accused of
"a capital crime, or of having used violence, or ... any offense
against the persons or property of the good people of the
United States, such as is punishable by the known laws of the
land" upon application made by or in behalf of the injured
party.75 This provision was the basis of Justice Douglas'
assertion that the context of the 1776 articles indicated that
soldiers who committed crimes would be tried in civil courts.
The Government argued in its brief, however, that the juxta-
position of Sections IX and X strongly suggested that court-
martial jurisdiction was to be exercised when the citizens of the
various states were subjected to abuses and disorders by officers
or soldiers and no application was made by or on behalf of the
injured party.76 General Washington seems to have been of
this view. When informed of the decision of a military Court of
Inquiry that a complaint by a civilian against an officer should
lie only in civil law, he stated in his General Order for February
24, 1779, that:
All improper treatment of an inhabitant by an officer or
soldier being destructive of good order and discipline as well
as subversive of the rights of society is as much a breach of
military, as civil law and as punishable by the one as the
other.7
72. W. WnqTmop, supra note 33, at 22. The Massachusetts Articles
of War are reprinted in id. at 947.
73. Girard, supra note 67, at 482.
74. Articles of War 1776, Section IX, Article I, quoted in Brief for
Respondent at 14-15, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
75. Articles of War 1776, Section X, Article I, quoted in Brief for
Respondent at 15, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
76. Brief for Respondent at 15, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258
(1969).
77. 14 WhTrNGs or WASmNGTON 140-41 (1779); Brief for Respond-
ent at 14, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
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The crux of the argument between majority and minority,
however, was over the role played by the general article, which
punished crimes "to the prejudice of good order and military
discipline."78  While Justice Douglas maintained that the gen-
eral article was interpreted to embrace only offenses which
had some direct impact on military discipline, Justice Harlan
argued that it was the vehicle for frequent courts-martial for
offenses against civilians and civil laws between the end of the
War of Independence and the beginning of the War of 1812.
The Government noted more than one hundred instances of
what it asserted were courts-martial of servicemen for non-
military offenses under the general article.7 9 Unpersuaded, Jus-
tice Douglas attempted to discredit the historical evidence pre-
sented by the Government in a footnote of his opinion.80 He
distinguished all prosecutions which occurred between 1773
and 1783 because they were for acts committed in wartime.8 '
Justice Douglas also distinguished all offenses involving officers
since, at least in the 18th century, the honor of an officer was
thought to give military significance to an otherwise non-mili-
tary crime. The remaining courts-martial were dismissed as in-
volving situations in which some special military interest existed.
Even excluding the offenses prosecuted in wartime and
those involving officers, however, Justice Douglas failed to dis-
tinguish adequately many of the court-martial prosecutions
noted by the Government. For example, the Government listed
peacetime prosecutions of non-officer servicemen for "riotously
beating a woman kept by him as a mistress, '8 2 "beating a Mr.
Williams an inhabitant living near this garrison,"8 3 "abusing and
using violence on Mrs. Cronkhyte, a citizen of the United
States,"8 4 and "going to a civilian's house and raising a riot
with the family, abusing wife and daughter."85 Keeping in mind
that the purpose of examining these early courts-martial is to
determine the intent of the founding fathers in approving clause
78. See text accompanying note 60 supra.
79. Brief for Respondent at 35-52, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S.
258 (1969).
80. 395 U.S. at 270 n.14.
81. Id. This distinction must have been persuasive to Justice
Harlan as well, for in discussing the prosecutions listed by the Gov-
ernment he referred only to those which took place between 1783 and
1812.
82. Brief for Respondent at 43, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258
(1969).
83. Id. at 49.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 50.
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14 of the Constitution, it is difficult to believe that they knew
of and approved courts-martial under these circumstances but
believed that any extension of court-martial jurisdiction would
be unconstitutional. Moreover, if the "service-connected" test
consistently were construed in light of the many distinctions
Justice Douglas made in refuting the government's evidence, the
test probably would be considerably narrower than Justice
Douglas would like.
In maintaining that the general article was interpreted to
apply only to crimes with some direct impact on military disci-
pline, Justice Douglas relied on Winthrop's Military Law and
Precedents,6 one of the outstanding treatises on military law.
After referring to crimes such as robbery, manslaughter and
assault, Colonel Winthrop stated:
[W]here such crimes are committed upon or against civilians,
and not at or near a military camp or post, or in breach or
violation of a military duty or order, they are not in general
to be regarded as within the description of the Articles, but are
to be treated as civil rather than military offenses.87
Winthrop's treatise was first published in 1886, nearly a cen-
tury after the Constitutional Convention. Most of the courts-
martial he referred to in support of his conclusions took place
during and after the Civil War.88 Consequently, it is not clear
whether Colonel Winthrop had access to the material cited by
the Government. Moreover, Winthrop was not attempting to
reconstruct the practice at the time of the Constitutional Con-
vention in order to ascertain the intent of the framers. His pur-
pose was simply to provide a workable legal rule for construction
of the general article during the latter part of the nineteenth
century. It is also significant that he recognized that:
[A] strict rule on this subject, however, has not been observed
in practice; and, especially as the civil courts do not readily
take cognizance of crimes when committed by soldiers, military
commanders generally lean to the sustaining of the jurisdiction
86. W. WINTHRoP, MILITAaY LAW AND PRECEDENTS (2d ed. 1896,
1920 reprint). Winthrop is also relied on by Duke & Vogel, supra note
61, at 446, to bolster the conclusion that the general article was not
used extensively in our early history to punish civilian crimes which
did not have a reasonably direct impact on good order and military
discipline. This was an important premise in the argument advanced by
Duke and Vogel that the Constitutional Convention probably never be-
lieved that Congress would grant the military the power to punish civil
crimes committed in time of peace.
87. W. WINTHRoP, supra note 86, at 724
88. See W. WinTHnop, supra note 86, at 723-26.
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of courts-martial in cases of crimes so committed against civil-
ians.8 9
Colonel Winthrop believed that the question of which crimes
were covered by the general article should "in general ...
properly be left to be decided by the Department, &c, com-
mander, in each instance."9 0 In light of the foregoing, Justice
Douglas' reliance on Winthrop's treatise hardly seems warranted.
Justice Douglas did not discuss the jurisdiction of naval
courts-martial during the period following the adoption of the
Constitution, although the government presented arguments
based thereon.9 1 Congress enacted Articles for the Better Gov-
ernment of the Navy in 1800.92 These articles provided that "All
offences committed by persons belonging to the navy while on
shore, shall be punished in the same manner as if they had been
committed at sea."93 Among the offenses punished if committed
at sea were murder, embezzlement and theft.9 4  The Govern-
ment argued that the extension of Navy court-martial juris-
diction to some common law crimes committed on shore indicated
that if, as argued by the petitioner, there were statutory limits
on army courts-martial jurisdiction, they were the result of
legislative choice rather than of any belief that Congress lacked
constitutional power to extend court-martial jurisdiction to
common law crimes.05
The question then arises as to what conclusions can be drawn
from the available historical evidence relating to the framers'
attitudes towards court-martial jurisdiction. Justice Douglas
concluded that they were suspicious of the military trial of
soldiers committing civilian offenses. Justice Harlan asserted
that the pertinent American history proved "if anything, quite
89. Id. at 725.
90. Id.
91. Brief for Respondent at 15-16, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S.
258 (1969).
92. Act of April 23, 1800, cl. 33, 2 Stat. 45. See the discussion of
the Navy Articles in Weiner, Courts-Martial and the Bill of Rights: The
Original Practice I, 72 HARv. L. REV. 1, 13-15 (1958).
93. Art. XVII, 2 Stat. 47.
94. Art. XXI (murder), art. XXIV (embezzlement), art. XXVI(theft), 2 Stat. 48.
95. Brief for Respondent at 16, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258(1969). The petitioner's reply brief responded to this argument by as-
serting that (1) "This Court has noted, however, the unique exigencies
of naval life which make precedents of naval court-martial jurisdiction
'entirely inapposite' to cases such as the present. See McElroy v.
United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281, 284-85."; (2) that art.
XVII was ambiguous; and (3) that the "on shore" reference did not
indicate whether it meant foreign or United States territory. Reply
Brief for Petitioner at 5-6, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 'U.S. 258 (1969).
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the contrary." 98 It does seem clear that many of the drafters of
the Constitution were acutely conscious of the dilemma posed
by the need for an effective army, and, on the other hand, the
dangers such an army would present to republican institutions
and civil freedom. They attempted to reconcile this dilemma in
part by vesting in Congress the power to make rules for the
government of the land and naval forces. They thus insured
that the people acting through Congress, rather than the Presi-
dent, would have the final word on such matters.9 7 It is also
true that they were sensitive to limitations on a civilian's right
to a jury trial because Parliament had authorized courts of
admiralty to try violations of the unpopular Molasses and
Navigation Acts.9 8 In order to find support for the majority's
position, however, one must find in this history both a sus-
picion of military trial of soldiers committing civilian offenses
and some basis for concluding that the framers assumed that
such soldiers should have constitutional protection against such
a trial. At best, the relevant historical evidence does not pro-
vide clear guidance. To be sure, it is doubtful that the drafters
ever contemplated the broad jurisdiction over civilian crimes
now provided by the statute. On the other hand, Justice Douglas
notwithstanding, the historical data presented by the Govern-
ment raises a strong presumption that the framers were familiar
with some court-martial jurisdiction over civilian crimes.
Moreover, there is considerable logic in Justice Harlan's
assertion that even if the practice of early American courts-
martial differed from the interpretation urged by the Govern-
ment, it does not follow that the limits of Congress' power are
coterminous with its exercise in the late 18th and early 19th
centuries.9 9 If the framers had believed that Congressional power
should be so limited, it seems likely that they would have ex-
pressed this belief in the Constitution. Instead, an examination
of the text reveals a simple grant of power with no express
limitations. The only reference in the fifth and sixth amend-
ments to members of the armed forces is the express exception
in the fifth amendment, and such an exception has been con-
strued to apply to the sixth amendment by implication. 100 Ac-
96. 395 U.S. at 276.
97. See 1 W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CoNSTnTuTIoN 413-14,
424-25 (1953); Duke & Vogel, supra note 61, at 448.
98. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 28-29 (1957).
99. 395 U.S. at 279-80.
100. Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127 (1950); Er parte
Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942); Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2,
123, 138-39 (1866).
[Vol. 54:1
COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION
cordingly, one must conclude that history does not provide an
adequate basis for the decision in O'Callahan.
C. EXPANSION OF THE COVERAGE OF THE ARTICLES OF WAR
In 1863, Congress expressly authorized courts-martial to try
civil crimes "in time of war, insurrection, or rebellion" without
regard to whether the commission of the crime prejudiced good
order and military discipline.10 1 The authority extended to lar-
ceny, robbery, burglary, arson, mayhem, manslaughter, murder,
assault and battery with intent to kill, wounding by shooting or
stabbing with an intent to commit murder, and rape or assault
with an intent to commit rape. 0 2 Congress further provided
that the punishment in such cases "shall never be less than those
inflicted by the laws of the state, territory, or district" in which
the offense was committed. 10 3 With minor changes, this pro-
vision was incorporated in the Articles of War adopted by Con-
gress in 1874.104
Peacetime court-martial jurisdiction for ordinary crimes
committed by members of the armed forces was first explicitly
authorized by the 1916 Articles of War. 0 5 These articles,
largely the work of Judge Advocate General Enoch H. Crow-
der, 0 6 were the result of a substantial effort to update the
Articles of War.1'07 Several important changes were made with
respect to military jurisdiction over civil crimes. Peacetime
court-martial jurisdiction was extended to specific civil offenses
such as robbery and assault. 0 8 In testimony before a Senate
committee, General Crowder stated that the change would
eliminate the confusion in pleading caused by the necessity of
charging civil crimes under the general article in peacetime but
under the specific article in time of war.10 9 The extension of
101. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 75, § 30, 12 Stat. 736.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Act of June 22, 1874, tit. XIV, ch. 5, art. 58, Rev. Stat. § 1342
(1878).
105. Act of August 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 1342, 39 Stat. 650-70. See
395 U.S. at 279 n.5.
106. Judge Advocate General of the Army from February 15, 1911,
to February 23, 1923. Fratcher, History of the Judge Advocate General's
Corps, United States Army, Mn.. L. Rzv., Vols. 1-10, Selected Reprint
191, at 202-07 (1965), summarizes some of the important aspects of Gen-
eral Crowder's career as Judge Advocate General.
107. Duke & Vogel, supra note 61, at 451.
108. Act of August 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 1342, art. 93, 39 Stat. 664.
109. S. REP. No. 130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1916); Duke & Vogel,
supra note 61, at 451.
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court-martial jurisdiction to the offenses of murder and rape
committed outside the United States 010 was the first author-
ization of peacetime court-martial jurisdiction over civil capital
offenses.'" The 1916 Articles were also extended to encompass
all non-capital civil crimes not otherwise expressly covered,
without regard to whether they were "to the prejudice of good
order and military discipline."" 2 Speaking of the previous lan-
guage in the general article, Colonel Winthrop had stated that
the words "[a] 11 crimes not capital" were qualified by the words
"to the prejudice of good order and military discipline.""13 Thus
in order to show a violation of the previous general article, the
prosecution had to prove both that a non-capital crime had been
committed and that its commission was to the prejudice of good
order and military discipline. The 1916 Articles also made it a
violation of the general article to engage in "conduct of a nature
to bring discredit upon the military service.""14  The present
general article, Article 134, is substantially the same as that
found in the 1916 promulgation.
The Articles of War were replaced by the Uniform Code of
Military Justice (UCMJ) in 1950.E 5 In addition to instituting
a number of very significant advances in the military justice
system, the UCMJ gave courts-martial power to try murder and
rape committed in the United States in peacetime and to impose
110. Act of August 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 1342, art. 96, 39 Stat. 666.
111. The Army General Staff recommended that military juris-
diction also extend to cases of murder and rape committed within the
United States. General Crowder and Findley M. Garrison, Secretary of
War, publicly disagreed, however. S. REP. No. 130, 64th Cong., 1st
Sess. 22, 87-89 (1916). Thus it was not surprising that Congress re-
jected the recommendation of the General Staff.
112. Act of August 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 1342, art. 96, 39 Stat. 666.
General Crowder's views on this topic can be found in S. REP. No. 130,
64th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1916).
113. W. Wrn mop, supra note 86, at 725-24.
114. Act of August 29, 1916, ch. 418, § 1342, art. 96, 39 Stat. 666. For
a discussion of this provision, see Hagan, The General Article-Elemental
Confusion, 10 Mm. L. REv. 63, 75-76 (1960).
Another important change made by the 1916 Articles was the elimi-
nation of the requirement for delivery of military offenders to civil
authorities in situations where the army was holding the soldier to
answer for a crime punishable by the Articles of War. Act of August
29, 1916, ch. 418, § 1342, art. 74, 39 Stat. 662. Although this change gave
the military priority of prosecution in certain cases, it did not give it
exclusive jurisdiction.
115. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964). Of course, Congress adopted other
Articles of War between the 1916 Articles and the UCMJ. See, e.g.,
the 1920 Articles of War, Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 787. How-
ever, these articles did not make substantial changes in the jurisdiction
of courts-martial over civil crimes.
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the death penalty upon conviction.116 The jurisdiction of
courts-martial over members of the armed services was now
complete.17
D. THE CASE LAW ON JURISDICTION OF MmiTARY TrIuNIALs
Several distinctions must be made if the cases dealing with
the jurisdiction of military tribunals are to be discussed with
clarity. It is first necessary to distinguish between martial law,
the law of war and military law."" "Martial law" is invoked
when the civil courts cannot function by reason of invasion,
insurrection or other disorder. 19 Under appropriate circum-
stances a civilian may be tried by a court-martial or military
commission when martial law has been invoked. The Supreme
Court has held, however, that civilians could not be tried by a
military tribunal if the civil courts were "open, and in the proper
and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction."120
The "law of war," a branch of international law, governs
the rights and duties of nations and individual combatants
during hostilities.' 12 The Supreme Court held in Ex parte
Quirin'22 that eight spies who came into the United States from a
German submarine during World War II could be tried by a mil-
itary commission. Although American civil courts were open
and one of the spies may have been an American citizen, the
Court applied the law of war and stated that there was no
116. UCMJ arts. 118, 120, 10 U.S.C. §§ 918, 920 (1964). For a dis-
cussion of improvements in military justice under the UCMJ, see Quinn,
Some Comparisons Between Courts-Martial and Civilian Practice, 15
U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1240 (1968).
117. The only opposition to this extension of jurisdiction during the
congressional hearings on the UCMJ was voiced by the Special Com-
mittee on Military Justice of the New York County Lawyers' Asso-
ciation. Hearings on the Uniform Code of Military Justice Before the
House Subcomm. of the Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,
at 644 (1949).
118. For discussion of the distinctions among these three categories,
see Everett, Military Jurisdiction Over Civilians, 1960 DUKE L.J. 366,
366-70; Girard, The Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians Accom-
panying the Armed Forces-A Preliminary Analysis, 13 STA-. L. R v.
461, 463-64 (1961).
119. Girard, supra note 118, at 463.
120. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866). The case
dealt with the trial of civilians by military commission during the Civil
War. The holding was reaffirmed in Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327
U.S. 304 (1946), which involved military jurisdiction over civilians in
Hawaii after the Pearl Harbor attack.
121. Everett, supra note 118, at 367-68.
122. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
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right to a jury trial.12 3  In the case of Madsen v. Kinsella,1 24
the Supreme Court held that a military court in occupied Ger-
many could try an American wife for killing her Air Force
husband.
"Military law" provides rules for the government of the
armed forces and is applicable in time of peace as well as war.125
The Uniform Code of Military Justice provides the basic legal
code for military law in the Armed Forces, and the judicial
tribunal established for the enforcement of this body of law is
the court-martial. It is military law and the court-martial with
which O'Callahan is concerned.
One further distinction which must be noted is the dis-
tinction between civilians-whether military dependents, dis-
charged soldiers, or civilian employees of the armed forces-and
persons who admittedly are members of the armed forces. Be-
ginning in 1955, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases
which, taken together, established the proposition that civilians
are not subject to court-martial jurisdiction in peacetime. 20 In
that year, courts-martial were held not to have jurisdiction over
a former serviceman who had terminated all connection with
the armed forces.127 In 1957, Reid v. Covert 28 held that courts-
martial had no power to try civilian dependents for capital
offenses committed overseas in peacetime. Kinsella v. Single-
ton'29 extended this ban to non-capital offenses committed by
civilian dependents, and in 1960 the Court held that courts-
martial have no jurisdiction over civilian employees of the mil-
itary, whether for capital or non-capital offenses.130
123. Id. at 39.
124. 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
125. Girard, supra note 118, at 463-64.
126. For a thorough discussion of the subject of military jurisdiction
over civilians, see the excellent articles by Everett and Girard, supra
note 118. For a comprehensive treatment of the subject of militaryjurisdiction over quasi-military persons, see Bishop, Court-Martial
Jurisdiction Over Military-Civilian Hybrids: Retired Regulars, Re-
servaists, and Discharged Prisoners, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 317 (1964).
127. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). After the defendant's dis-
charge from the Air Force, evidence was discovered which indicated that,
while serving in Korea, he had collaborated with two others in murder-
ing a Korean.
128. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (prosecution of a woman who had slain her
serviceman husband while in Great Britain). In an earlier decision on
the same case, the Court upheld the court martial jurisdiction. Reid v.
Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
129. 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (prosecution in Germany of a civilian de-
pendent for involuntary manslaughter of her young child).
130. Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960) (civilian employee of
the Army attached to an installation in France tried for murder); Mc-
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The issue in O'Caflahan, however, was whether a court-
martial could constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over mem-
bers of the armed forces alleged to have committed civil
crimes. Although the Court had never directly passed on this
issue, an examination of the cases dealing with other juris-
dictional facets reveals a wealth of dicta stating rather clearly
that jurisdiction over members of the armed forces depends
solely on status, and that persons serving in the armed forces
are subject to court-martial jurisdiction for any offense as long
as Congress has so provided.
In 1885, the Court stated that:
Under every system of military law for the government of
either land or naval forces, the jurisdiction of courts martial
extends to the trial and punishment of acts of military or naval
officers which tend to bring disgrace and reproach upon the
service of which they are members, whether those acts are
done in the performance of military duties, or in a civil position,
or in a social relation, or in private business.' 3'
Writing for the majority in Ex parte Quirin'3 2 in 1942, Chief
Justice Stone discussed the fifth amendment exception for cases
arising in the land and naval forces:
Its objective was quite different-to authorize the trial by
court martial of the members of our Armed Forces for all that
class of crimes which under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments
might otherwise have been deemed triable in the civil courts.
The cases mentioned in the exception are not restricted to those
involving offenses against the law of war alone, but extend to
trial of all offenses, including crimes which were of the class
traditionally triable by jury at common law.1 33
More recently in the 1960 case of Kinsella v. Singleton,'3 4
the Court asserted that:
The test for jurisdiction, it follows, is one of status, namely,
whether the accused in the court-martial proceeding is a per-
son who can be regarded as falling within the term "land and
naval Forces."' 3 5
Elroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).
Guagliardo was a consolidation of two cases. In one, a civilian em-
ployee performing the duties of an electrical lineman at an air depot
near Casablanca, Morocco, was tried for larceny and conspiracy to com-
mit larceny. In the other, a civilian auditor employed by the Army in
Berlin was tried for sodomy.
131. Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167 (1885). The defendant, who held
the position of paymaster general, was alleged to have promoted the
interests of certain contractors at the expense of the Government. He
sought a writ of prohibition to prevent his trial by court martial, arguing,
inter alia, that his office was purely civil.
132. 317 U.S. 1 (1942). See also text accompanying notes 122-23
supra.
133. Id. at 43.
134. 361 U.S. 234 (1960). See also text accompanying note 129 supra.
135. Id. at 240-41.
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Kinsella involved the power of a court-martial to try a civilian
dependent of a serviceman for a non-capital offense. In reject-
ing the Government's contention that Reid v. Covert,8 6 which
also involved a civilian dependent, was distinguishable because
it involved a capital offense, the Court stated:
The Government makes no claim that historically there was
ever any distinction made as to the jurisdiction of courts-
martial to try civilian dependents on the basis of capital as
against noncapital offenses. Without contradiction, the ma-
terials furnished show that military jurisdiction has always been
based on the "status" of the accused, rather than on the nature
of the offense. To say that military jurisdiction "defies defi-
nition in terms of military 'status'" is to defy unambiguous
language of Art. I, § 8, cl. 14, as well as the historical back-
ground thereof and the precedents with reference thereto.8 7
Following the lead of the Supreme Court, the lower federal
courts have consistently held that jurisdiction over members of
the armed forces is solely a question of status.38 Thus, al-
though the O'Callahan decision did not specifically overrule any
prior decisions of the Supreme Court, it clearly represents a
sharp departure from what had long been considered to be an
established principle of law.
IV. THE "SERVICE-CONNECTED" TEST FOR
COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION
A. SoiVE GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Except in such fringe categories as reservists, retired mil-
itary personnel and discharged prisoners,8 9 the "status" test of
136. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). See text accompanying note 128 supra.
137. 361 U.S. 234, 243 (1960). Interestingly enough, Justice Harlan
dissented in Kinsella v. Singleton, objecting to the reliance of the ma-
jority on status as the test of jurisdiction. Id. at 257. For other Supreme
Court cases containing similar language, see, e.g., Duncan v. Kahan-
amoku, 327 U.S. 304, 313 (1946); Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109, 114
(1895); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 514 (1878); Ex parte Mil-
ligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 123 (1866).
138. E.g., Owens v. Markley, 289 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1961); Burns
v. Taylor, 274 F.2d 141 (10th Cir. 1959); O'Callahan v. Chief United
States Marshal, 293 F. Supp. 441 (D. Mass. 1966); Jennings v. Markley,
186 F. Supp. 611 (S.D. Ind. 1960).
The defendant's usual jurisdictional argument in the lower federal
courts has been that the fifth amendment exception applies only in time
of war or public danger. See, e.g., Wright v. Markley, 351 F.2d 592(7th Cir. 1965); Thompson v. Willingham, 318 F.2d 647 (3rd Cir. 1963).
As pointed out in note 25 supra, however, the phrase "when in actual
service in time of war or public danger" has long been construed to
modify only "militia." See the discussion of the lower court treatment
of this issue in Bishop, supra note 126, at 327-28.
139. For discussions of these problems see Blair, Court-Martial
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military jurisdiction, which was the law prior to O'Callahan,
was a relatively simple and workable tool to determine who
was subject to court-martial. Whatever its shortcomings, its
application required relatively little sophistication. And, at
least on the surface, the O'Calahan standard also sounds rela-
tively uncomplicated. The words "service-connected" do not
automatically suggest the subtleties and complications lurking
beneath the surface. Nevertheless, there is more than a little
substance to Justice Harlan's assertion that the standard laid
down by the majority "has thrown the law in this realm into a
demoralizing state of uncertainty."'140
Before considering some of the more difficult questions
which may arise in the application of the "service-connected"
test, it should be emphasized that some offenses under the
UCMJ clearly are unaffected by O'Callahan. Implicit in the
majority opinion is the assumption that offenses can be cate-
gorized either as "military" or as "ordinary civil crimes." Nu-
merous offenses under the UCMJ are, indeed, by their terms and
on their face, purely military and thus "service-connected."
Examples of such offenses are desertion, absence without leave,
missing movement, disrespect toward superior commissioned of-
ficers, willful disobedience of a superior commissioned officer,
insubordination toward a noncommissioned officer, mutiny,
failure to obey an order or regulation and damage or destruction
of military property.141 On the other hand, it does not follow
that the military is without jurisdiction simply because other
provisions of the UCMJ can be described as "civil" in nature.
The offense of rape under the UCMJ can readily be categorized
as "civil." Yet the attempted rape of a servicewoman on a
military post clearly would be "service-connected." Put simply,
the military has jurisdiction over these offenses in some cases but
not in others. Thus, while it is possible to categorize certain
provisions of the UCMJ as military on their face and therefore
subject to military jurisdiction, it is impossible in the vast
Jurisdiction Over Retired Regulars: An Unwarranted Extension of
Military Power, 50 GEo. L.J. 79 (1961); Bishop, supra note 126.
140. 395 U.S. at 276.
141. UCMJ arts. 85-92, 94(1) (3), 108; 10 U.S.C. §§ 885-92, 894
(1) (3), 908 (1964). Other examples of offenses in this category are
escape, releasing a prisoner without proper authority, unlawful de-
tention, misbehavior before enemy, subordinate compelling surrender,
improper use of a countersign, forcing a safeguard, captured or aban-
doned property, aiding the enemy, drunk on duty, malingering, and
misbehavior of a sentinel. See UCMJ arts. 95-97, 99, 100-104, 112, 113;
10 U.S.C. §§ 895-897, 899, 900-904, 912, 913 (1964).
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majority of cases to classify other UCMJ provisions as "civil"
on their face and therefore not subject to military jurisdiction.
B. POSSIBLE CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE STANDARD
Some of the language in the majority opinion could be used
to minimize the impact of O'Callahan on court-martial juris-
diction by narrowing the scope of the "service-connected" test.
Specifically, the Court noted that the petitioner was
on leave when he committed the crimes with which he is
charged. There was no connection-not even the remotest
one-between his military duties and the crimes in question.
The crimes were not committed on a military post or enclave;
nor was the person whom he attacked performing any duties
relating to the military. Moreover, Hawaii, the situs of the
crime, is not an armed camp under military control, as are
some of our far-flung outposts.
Finally, we deal with peacetime offenses, not with author-
ity stemming from the war power. Civil courts were open.
The offenses were committed within our territorial limits, not
in the occupied zone of a foreign country. The offenses did
not involve any question of the flouting of military authority,
the security of a military post, or the integrity of military
property.142
It could be argued that offenses are "service-connected" unless
they fall completely within the above description. Under this
reasoning, the fact that an offense was committed during a
period other than "peacetime" would result in military juris-
diction. Similarly, any offense committed outside the territorial
limits of the United States or any offense committed on a mili-
tary post would be subject to court-martial jurisdiction. The
result of such a reading would be that the great bulk of offenses
committed by servicemen would be "service-connected." Since
such an approach would as a practical matter emasculate
O'Ca~lahan, it seems unlikely that the Court will resort to it un-
less it decides to relegate the "service-connected" test to the
scrap heap of unused doctrines.
It also would be possible to equate the "service-connected"
test with the tests developed over the years to delineate the
scope of the general article, now found in Article 134 of the
UCMJ.143 Three types of conduct are covered by Article 134:
(1) disorders and neglects which prejudice good order and dis-
cipline in the armed forces; (2) service-discrediting conduct; and
(3) crimes and offenses not capital.144 The third clause, which
142. 395 U.S. at 273.
143. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964).
144. Everett, Article 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice-A
Study in Vagueness, 37 N.C.L. REv. 142, 143 (1959).
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has only marginal importance to the analysis at this point, has
been interpreted to be simply an assimilative provision which
incorporates non-capital crimes established by Congress and
made triable in federal civil courts.145 The first two clauses are
invoked to prosecute servicemen for offenses not specified in any
other article of the UCMJ. 46 Examples of such offenses, which
are listed by the Manual For Courts-Martial, are bigamy, in-
decent assault, negligent homicide and receiving stolen prop-
erty.147 However, prosecutions under Article 134 are not lim-
ited to those offenses specifically listed in the Manual.148
The reason that it would be possible to equate the O'Calla-
han standard with the first two clauses of Article 134 is that in
prosecutions under these two clauses it is not sufficient to estab-
lish that a serviceman is guilty of one of the offenses listed in
the Manual; it must also be proven that the acts constituting
the offense were either "to the prejudice of good order and
discipline in the armed forces" or "service-discrediting con-
duct."1 49  In other words, the prosecution must prove the com-
mission of an offense and also prove that its commission affects
the military. O'Callahan would appear to impose a similar
standard in its requirement that the offense be "service-con-
nected." The advantage of equating these two situations would
be that military and federal courts presumably could utilize
ready-made case precedent in defining "service-connection" un-
der the O'Callahan, standard.
The overriding problem with such an approach, however, is
that even after years of military court interpretation of Article
134, a uniform standard has not been achieved. To be sure, the
Manual For Courts-Martial attempts to place some limits on the
language "to the prejudice of good order and discipline" by
stating that it encompasses directly prejudicial acts and excludes
acts prejudicial in a remote or indirect sense. 5 0 Moreover, there
is language in the cases to the effect that the concept of "service-
discrediting conduct" was not intended to establish "a moral
145. See Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1907); Wiener,
Are the General Military Articles Unconstitutionally Vague?, 54 A.B.A.J.
357, 358 (1968). For examples of federal crimes triable under this sec-
tion, see Everett, supra note 144, at 147.
146. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UITrM STATES 1969 (Rev. ed.)
213a at 28-71 [hereinafter cited as MANUAL].
147. See MAwUAL I 213a-f at 28-71 to 28-81.
148. See Everett, supra note 144, at 160.
149. MANUAL, I 213d at 28-73.
150. Id. V 213b at 28-72. See also United States v. Ragan, 14 U.S.C.
M.A. 119, 33 C.M.R. 331 (1963).
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standard for the conduct of an individual in private." 1' Even
so, the judicial interpretations of Article 134 have not yielded a
consistent standard.152 For example, the United States Court of
Military Appeals has indicated that simple fornication would
not violate Article 134; 153 on the other hand, where two service-
men picked up two German girls in a Berlin cafe and later
shared the same hotel room, the fact that there were four in-
stead of two in the same room made the fornication "service
discrediting."1 54  As one scholar has pointed out, the criminal
liability seems to have hinged upon the soldiers' thrift in shar-
ing a room.15 5 Moreover, the focus in recent years seems to
be more on proving the substantive offense and less on deter-
mining whether the conduct prejudices order and discipline or
discredits the service. This may be because the United States
Court of Military Appeals considers the latter to be questions of
fact, to be decided by the members of the court-martial, rather
than questions of law. 56 A final reason for rejecting such an
approach is the danger that Article 134 may be void for vague-
ness, a possibility mentioned by the O'Callahan majority and
one which is receiving increasing attention by commentators.' 57
Thus, although attempts to construe Article 134 may be rele-
vant to questions raised by O'CaZlahan, equation of the O'Ca~la-
han standard with the scope of Article 134 would be unlikely to
advance the understanding of either.
It is also difficult, if not impossible, to devise a workable,
single-factor, talismanic test for use in applying the O'Caflahan
standard. A few examples will illustrate the problem. It could
be argued that all crimes committed by servicemen on a military
reservation should be subject to court-martial jurisdiction.
There would be merit to such an argument since most crimes,
violent or nonviolent, either affect the peace and good order of
the reservation or are detrimental to military operations. On
the other hand, suppose an army private owns property in a
distant home state and needs the signature of a hesitant co-owner
to convey the property. If the private forges the signature while
at his desk on the post, it would be difficult to maintain that
151. United States v. Snyder, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 423, 4 C.M.R. 15 (1952).
152. Everett, supra note 144, at 143.
153. United States v. Snyder, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 423, 425, 4 C.M.R. 15, 17
(1952).
154. United States v. Barry, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 609, 20 C.M.R. 325 (1956).
155. Everett, supra note 144, at 145.
156. Everett, supra note 144, at 154-55; Hagan, The General Ar-
ticle-Elemental Confusion, 10 Mm. L. REv. 63, 114 (1960).
157. See, e.g., Wiener, supra note 145.
[Vol. 54:1I
COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION
the act is "service-connected" and thus subject to prosecution
for forgery under Article 123 of the UCMJ. 58 The same diffi-
culty is inherent in a single-factor test based on whether the
serviceman is on or off duty. Although one would expect that
offenses committed while on duty are service-connected it is
difficult to argue that because a person is on duty when he
deposits an obscene letter in a mail box, court-martial jurisdic-
tion automatically attaches. It is equally difficult to maintain
that all offenses committed by a serviceman on leave or off
duty are not "service-connected." For example, court-martial
jurisdiction would be proper as to a serviceman who, while on
leave, conspires to rob the local army finance office or plans
the assassination of his commanding general. Nor would it be
desirable to premise jurisdiction wholly on whether a person is
in or out of uniform. Although the military would have an in-
terest in the conduct of a serviceman in uniform who commits
an offense of a public nature, court-martial jurisdiction might
not be proper in the case of an off-duty serviceman in uniform
who discreetly enters a hotel room to have an extra-marital
affair. In short, any single-factor jurisdictional test will not
yield satisfactory results in all cases.
C. A MULTI-FACTOR APPROACH
The foregoing discussion illustrates the difficulties inherent
in a simple, all-purpose standard for determining what offenses
are "service-connected." Yet some general guidelines must be
established if the military and the lower federal courts are to
apply the "service-connected" test satisfactorily. Accordingly,
it is submitted that "service-connection" could be determined
by a multi-factor test analogous to that employed by the Restate-
ment (Second), Conflict of Laws to determine the applicable
law in a multi-state tort or contract case.159 Such an approach
would take into account the fact that in numerous situations a
combination of factors, rather than any single factor in isolation,
will determine whether court-martial jurisdiction exists. The
following criteria are offered as a starting point for promulgating
such a multi-factor test:
158. 10 U.S.C. § 923 (1964). The same objection could be raised in
the following situation. Suppose an army private gives a deposition
to a civilian court reporter in the living room of his quarters on a mil-
itary reservation in connection with a will contest in his home state. He
perjures himself. It would be equally difficult to sustain a court-martial
under Article 131 of the UCMJ. 10 U.S.C. § 931 (1964).
159. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLCT OF LAWS §§ 145, 188
(Proposed Official Draft 1968).
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1. There shall be court-martial jurisdiction over any of-
fense under the UCMJ which reasonably can be charac-
terized as "purely military" or "military on its face."
COMMENT: It has already been noted that certain purely
military offenses do not raise O'Callahan problems.1 60 Exam-
ples of such offenses are desertion, disrespect toward superior
commissioned officers and mutiny. Such offenses must be
"service-connected" for the obvious reason that, by definition,
they exist only in a military situation.
2. There shall be court-martial jurisdiction over any of-
fense under the UCMJ not included in paragraph one
(above) where it is determined that the offense is service-
connected. Factors to be taken into account in making
such a determination include:
a. The place where the offense was committed.
COMMENT: The commission of an offense on or near a mil-
itary reservation supports court-martial jurisdiction while the
fact that the offense was committed in an area remote from
such a reservation tends to negate jurisdiction. If the offense
takes place outside the United States or its territories, the likeli-
hood of jurisdiction being present is increased because of the
possible absence of other forms of judicial administration or of
constitutional protections, or the presence of a treaty with a
foreign government obligating the military to take jurisdiction.
b. The status of the victim and of those involved
with the accused in committing the offense.
COMMENT: Where the victim or those aiding in the com-
mission of the crime are members of the armed services or are
military dependents, the effect on the military is multiplied and
thus the case for military jurisdiction is strengthened. On the
other hand, if the victim was unconnected with the military and
the accused acted alone, as in O'Callahan, the case for court-
martial jurisdiction is weakened.
c. Whether the accused is an officer or an enlisted
man.
COMMENT: The fact that the accused is an officer rather
than an enlisted man would weigh in favor of military juris-
diction because the commission of some offenses would impair
the confidence of enlisted men in the officer and thus diminish
160. See text accompanying note 141 supra.
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his effectiveness and the effectiveness of officers in general in
the discharge of responsibilities.
d. The duty status of the accused.
COMMENT: Presumably, anything that a serviceman does
while on duty can affect the performance of his responsibilities.
Consequently, the case for jurisdiction is stronger if the offense
is committed while the accused is on duty and weaker if it is
committed while he is on leave.
e. Whether the accused was in uniform or civilian
clothes.
COMMENT: The fact that a serviceman commits an offense in
uniform to some extent associates the offense with the military
establishment in the public's eye, and thus tends to impair pub-
lic confidence in the military.
f. Whether the nation is at peace or war.
COMMENT: Since it is sometimes necessary to vest greater
power in the military during war, the fact that the nation is at
war might favor military jurisdiction.161
g. Whether the offense is committed in a zone of
hostilities.
COMMENT: Because of the necessity to maintain order and
discipline in a critical area, the fact that an offense is committed
in an area of hostilities will dictate court-martial jurisdiction in
most instances even in the absence of other factors favoring
jurisdiction.
h. The extent to which the commission of the of-
fense casts discredit upon the military.
COMMENT: To the extent that the circumstances indicate that
the effect of the offense will tend to discredit the military, the
existence of court-martial jurisdiction is enhanced. This factor
depends to some degree upon the other factors and is more likely
to be relevant when other factors favor court-martial juris-
diction.
3. The factors listed in paragraph two should be evalu-
ated according to their relative importance with respect
to the particular offense.
COMMENT: The decision on whether court-martial jurisdic-
tion exists should not be based upon a quantitative evaluation
of the factors enumerated in paragraph two. The fact that some
161. There is a considerable problem, of course, in determining what
constitutes "in time of war." See text accompanying note 271 infra.
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of the above factors are entitled to greater weight than others
and that the importance of a factor may vary according to the
offense and the circumstances surrounding the offense neces-
sitates a qualitative analysis. For example, court-martial juris-
diction should exist over most offenses committed on a military
reservation. Even if an off duty serviceman murders a civilian
who happens to be traveling through the post, the necessity of
maintaining the peace and order of t-he post is enough to sus-
tain jurisdiction. As a general matter, it is submitted that
factors a, b, c, d, g and h are more important than factors e
and f. The fact that the nation is engaged in war in one part
of the world should not be decisive on the issue of jurisdiction
over a case arising in other parts of the world. Nor should the
fact that the accused was in uniform at the time of the offense
be especially important in the absence of other factors favoring
court-martial jurisdiction. As suggested, the fact that the of-
fense is committed on a military post can be very significant.
On the other hand, the fact that a crime is committed outside
the United States may not be of particular importance if the
foreign government has adequate methods of coping with such
offenses.
D. APPLIcATION OF A MULTI-FACTOR APPROACH
The application of such a multi-factor test to concrete fact
situations will illustrate how the test would operate in practice.
It will also serve to illustrate the interrelationship and com-
plexities of the various factors as well as to point out the
problems created by the Court's rejection of the status test of
court-martial jurisdiction.
Application of the multi-factor test to O'Calahan probably
would yield the same result as was reached by the Court. With
the possible exception of the extent to which the offense cast
discredit upon the military, none of the factors favoring military
jurisdiction were present. Suppose, however, that the petitioner
in O'Callahan had acted in concert with several other service-
men in breaking into the room and attempting to rape the
young girl. Factor b would be invoked and, in addition, the
weight to be given factor h would be increased. Under such
circumstances, the case for jurisdiction would have been much
stronger.
During oral argument in O'CalIahan, Justice Fortas asked
whether a soldier, in civilian clothes who cashed a bad check in
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a civilian store would be subject to court-martial jurisdiction.162
Assuming also that this serviceman was off duty and in the
United States, application of the multi-factor test probably
would result in a finding of civil jurisdiction. On the other
hand, if it could be shown that bad check offenses by service-
men were a chronic problem in this particular community, per-
haps the service-discrediting effect would be sufficient to change
the result. So too, if several servicemen were engaged in a
concerted effort to pass bad checks, this factor, when considered
in connection with the service-discrediting effect, might tip the
balance in favor of court-martial jurisdiction.
In United States v. Stackhouse,168 recently decided by the
Court of Military Appeals, an Air Force sergeant and his family
occupied an apartment in a town not part of a military reser-
vation. Several female occupants of the building complained
that on numerous occasions the door to the accused's apartment
was left partially open so that in passing they could see the
accused in the nude. The accused was convicted by general
court-martial of willful and wrongful indecent exposure under
the general article of the UCMJ.114 Although the conviction
was reversed on other grounds, the facts provide an example of
a case in which the application of a multi-factor test would
probably result in a finding of no court-martial jurisdiction.
The offense was committed by an enlisted man, off post, off
duty, in the United States, and obviously out of uniform. Al-
though the commission of the offense may have cast discredit
on the military, the absence of any other factors connecting
the offense to the armed services would make it difficult to sus-
tain court-martial jurisdiction.
E. OBSERVATIONS
Because of the complexity of the problems created by the
requirement that offenses must be "service-connected" before
court-martial jurisdiction can arise, and because of the countless
possible permutations of fact, it is inevitable that relevant factors
were overlooked in drafting the test suggested above. But the
promulgation of such a standard serves the corollary purpose of
illustrating the difficulties that will be encountered by those
charged with applying the "service-connected" test. Since a
162. 37 U.S.L.W. 3271 (1969).
163. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 479, 37 C.M.R. 99 (1967).
164. 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964).
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subsequent finding of no jurisdiction over the subject matter
can invalidate an entire proceeding, it is particularly important
to have jurisdictional rules that are relatively easy to apply.
As suggested in another context:
Jurisdiction should be as self-regulated as breathing . .. and
litigation over whether the case is in the right court is essen-
tially a waste of time and resources.165
Unfortunately, however, it does not seem that the "service-
connected" test can be clear cut. It is possible, of course, that
the problems inherent in a multi-factor approach will persuade
the Supreme Court to give O'Calahan a narrow construction. 166
Absent such a denouement, however, it seems likely that a
workable definition of "service-connection" must evolve on a
case-by-case basis.
V. A POSSIBLE "PETTY OFFENSE" LIMITATION
Because the majority gave particular weight to the avail-
ability of the rights of indictment by grand jury and jury trial
in a civil proceeding,167 O'Caflahan must be considered in light
of the Supreme Court decisions defining the scope of these
rights. The Court's recent decision in Duncan v. Louisiana68
held that the fourteenth amendment requires the states to grant
jury trials in all cases where the Constitution would impose the
same requirement in federal courts. Under the federal standard,
a jury trial is not constitutionally compelled for a "petty of-
fense.' ' 69 The Court, however, has yet to draw a clear line be-
165. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute,
36 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1968). In a similar vein is the following language
from the American Law Institute's STUDY OF THE DV wsioN OF JumIs-
DICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, pt. I, at 72 (Official
Draft 1965): "It is of first importance to have a definition so clear cut
that it will not invite extensive threshold litigation over jurisdiction."
166. See text accompanying note 142 supra.
167. See text accompanying note 17 supra. It should be pointed out,
however, that the Court did mention other differences between a court-
martial and a civilian court. Among these were the fact that the pre-
siding officer at a court-martial is a military officer, not a judge; and
the fact that command influence plays a role in the court-martial. 395
U.S. at 264. Although the Court was also disturbed about the possible
vagueness of Article 134 and stated that "[ojne of the benefits of a
civilian trial is that the trap of Article 134 may be avoided by a
declaratory judgment proceeding or otherwise." "The thrust of the
Court's reasoning centered on the protection of the grand jury and jury
trial rights." Id. at 266.
168. 391 U.S. 148 (1968).
169. The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARy. L. REV. 63, 150
(1968); W. BARRON & A. HOLTzoFr, FEDERAL PRACTICE AN PROCEDURE,
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tween petty and serious offenses, and the case law provides few
guiding principles.170 The Court in Duncan was confronted
with an authorized punishment of two years for a simple battery
and thus found it relatively easy to classify the crime as "seri-
ous." Among the considerations thought to be relevant in
other cases have been the nature of the offense and the maxi-
mum authorized punishment or, in situations where there is no
statutory limit on punishment, the actual punishment im-
posed.171 The Court has recently said, however, that the "most
relevant indication of the seriousness of an offense is the
severity of the penalty authorized for its commission."17 2  In
addition, the Court in Duncan stated that "crimes carrying
possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial
if they otherwise qualify as petty."1 73 It has been pointed out
that although there is logic in defining offenses on the basis of
the infamy attributed to them by the public, "the nature of the
offense test is difficult to apply objectively."'17 4 Moreover, in
view of the fact that the "six months" rule has had wide
acceptance, 75 it has been suggested that the court could well
adopt the test as the constitutional standard.17 6
The right to indictment in "capital and infamous crimes"
under the fifth amendment 177 has received somewhat similar
treatment by the Court. Indictment by grand jury is not re-
quired in every federal prosecution; instead, whether or not a
crime is "infamous" depends upon the character of the punish-
ment which may be imposed.178 Thus, although it has been held
that an indictment is required for an offense punished by both
§ 371 (C. Wright ed. 1969). See generally Kaye, Petty Offenders Have
No Peers, 26 U. Cm. L. REv. 245 (1959).
170. The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, supra note 169, at 152. Cf.
Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guarantee of Trial by Jury, 39 HARV. L. Rev. 917, 982 (1926).
171. See Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966) (actual pun-
ishment imposed); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937)
(maximum authorized punishment); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540
(1888) (nature of the offense).
172. Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969).
173. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968).
174. The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, supra note 169, at 153.
175. The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, supra note 169, at 153. See
also AmEICAx BAR Ass'N PROJECT ON AM M SmTANDARS FOR CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE, ADvisoRY Comm. ON T CmnAL TRIAL STANDARDS
RELATING To TRIAL BY JURY 20-23 (Approved draft 1968).
176. The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, supra note 169, at 153.
177. The right to indictment by grand jury is not presently appli-
cable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
178. Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885).
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imprisonment at hard labor for one year and deportation,170
the Court has held that indictment was not mandatory under
an act providing for a fine of not more than $1000 or imprison-
ment for not more than six months.'8 0 In fact, the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure require a grand jury indictment
only for offenses which may be punished by imprisonment at
hard labor or for a term exceeding one year.' 8 ' Thus, something
roughly analogous to a "petty offense" exception also applies to
the fifth amendment indictment requirement.
The Court's "petty offense" exceptions to rights of grand
jury indictment and jury trial in civil proceedings suggest the
possibility that O'Callahan may be lhnited by a similar excep-
tion, so that court-martial jurisdiction would attach to a petty
offense despite the fact that it is not "service-connected." The
argument finds support in logic and policy. If the Court is pre-
pared to say that petty offenses tried in a civilian court do
not require an indictment or jury trial, it would be anomalous
to assert that the military loses jurisdiction because these rights
are not available. To deny the military jurisdiction over the
non-"service-connected" petty offense would create no new
rights for the accused, and the reasoning behind the O'Callahan
decision thereby becomes inapplicable.
At this point it must be noted that most courts-martial are
conducted by judicial tribunals which are prohibited by statute
from imposing more than six months' imprisonment. The tri-
bunals thus limited in their power to impose sentence are the
special and summary courts-martial. The special court-martial
has been called "the military equivalent of a civilian court that
can try only misdemeanor cases.' 8 2 Although it has juris-
diction over all noncapital offenses and most servicemen, it
may impose only a maximum of six months' confinement, hard
labor without confinement for three months, forfeiture of two-
thirds pay for six months, reduction in rank, a bad conduct
discharge, or any combination of these.-8 3 The summary court-
martial, a court somewhat akin to a civilian magistrate or com-
179. Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 237 (1896).
180. Duke v. United States, 301 U.S. 492 (1937).
181. FED. R. CRwv. P. 7 (a); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 426 (1885).
182. Mounts & Sugarman, The Militaj Justice Act of 1968, 55
A.B.A.J. 470, 471 (1969).
183. UCMJ art. 19, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964); MANuAL 15a, b at
4-5, f 127c at 25-18. As a practical matter, bad conduct discharges are
infrequently adjudged because Article 19 requires a full transcript in
order to impose them.
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missioner's court,18 4 may try most noncapital cases, but is gen-
erally limited to the trial of enlisted men and the imposition of a
maximum of one month's imprisonment, hard labor without
confinement for forty-five days, limited reduction in rank and
a fine of two-thirds of a month's pay, or any combination of
these.8 5 Only the general court-martial is authorized to impose
over six months' imprisonment. 86 Thus, if the Court were to
apply the petty offense exception to O'Caflahan, it follows that
cases that would have been tried by a special or summary court-
martial had O'Caflahan not been decided would continue to be
so tried. Although both types of court-martial may levy fines,
impose grade reductions and in certain situations adjudge bad
conduct discharges, the maximum imprisonment authorized is
six months. 8 7 If six months is taken as the line of demarcation
in determining the right to jury trial in civilian cases (and
similar reasoning is adopted to determine the right to grand jury
indictment), the Court could very well condone special and
summary court-martial jurisdiction exactly as it existed prior to
O'Callahan.188 Indeed, since the serviceman would be "de-
nied" the rights of indictment and jury trial only in situations
where a civil trial would ordinarly not require such rights, an
argument can well be made that the "service-connected" test is
wholly inapplicable.
Three possible objections could be made to such an approach.
First, it could be argued that it would be possible for the mil-
itary to try every noncapital case by a special or summary
court-martial free from the strictures of O'Callahan. It would
conceivably place in the hands of the military an absolute dis-
cretion to exercise court-martial jurisdiction over non-" service-
connected" offenses simply by downgrading the offense to a
special court-martial, thereby stripping the accused of the rights
contemplated by O'Caflahan.38 9 The concept of the petty of-
184. Mounts & Sugarman, supra note 182, at 472.
185. UCMJ art. 16, 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1964); MAxuAL, 16a, b at
4-6, 127c at 25-18.
186. See UCMT art. 18, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1964); MANrAL, 14a, b at
4-4. As a general rule, the sentencing of any enlisted person to con-
finement, whether by general, special, or summary court-martial, results
in an automatic grade reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. See UCMJ
art. 58a, 10 U.S.C. § 858a (1964); MANuAL, 126e, at 25-4.
187. See text accompanying notes 183-85 supra.
188. Cf. Hearings on S. Res. 260 Before the Subcomm. on Con-
stitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess., 563 (1962).
189. See Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 244-45 (1960).
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fense, it could be argued, should not completely span a crim-
inal code; but it should be limited to truly minor offenses,
such as public drunkenness, disorderly conduct, and the like.
Of course, it is unlikely that the military would desire to
try noncapital crimes such as armed robbery and manslaughter
to a special or summary court-martial because of the limitations
on the punishment. In any event, if the Court were reluctant to
take the broad approach described above, it still would be pos-
sible to define a category of military "petty offenses" similar to
those crimes considered petty in the civilian sector without
regard to the special or summary court-martial's statutory juris-
diction. This would enable the military to maintain court-
martial jurisdiction with respect to many minor but vexatious
offenses not otherwise meeting the O'Callahan test.
Second, it could be argued that special court-martial punish-
ment cannot be equated with the general exception to the grand
jury indictment and jury trial requirements because military
confinement is at hard labor, and such punishment not only
requires a grand jury indictment in civil criminal trials under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 90 but is perhaps not to
be considered "petty" for purposes of the jury trial requirement.
However, it is questionable whether the term "hard labor" in the
context of military confinement is meaningful, since all members
of the armed forces are required to work whether in confine-
ment or in duty status. The work performed by prisoners is
often no different than that performed by comparable duty
status personnel.191
Finally, it could be argued that the additional punishments
that a special court-martial can impose in addition to the six
months' imprisonment at hard labor cause the offense to surpass
the definition of "petty." There is some merit to this argument,
since the special court-martial can impose substantial fines,
limited hard labor without confinement, reduction in grade, and
in some instances a bad conduct discharge in addition to six
months' imprisonment. This argument has less validity as ap-
plied to the summary court-martial because the punishments
therein are relatively minor. 9 2 And, if a "petty offense" ex-
ception is adopted, Congress could perhaps circumvent the prob-
lem by limiting the punishment that could be imposed by special
190. See note 181 supra.
191. See generally Herrod, The United States Disciplinary Barracks
System, 8 Miu. L, REv. 35, 36 (1960); Amviy RE.G. 210-181.
192. See text accompanying note 184 supra.
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courts-martial in O'Callahan situations to the same punishment
described in the federal criminal code definition of "petty of-
fenses," i.e., imprisonment not to exceed six months or a fine
of not more than $500, or both.193 In fact, the Court itself could
impose such a limitation. Such an approach would mean that
the military would have to handle discharges and grade reduc-
tions either administratively or by general court-martial.194
VI. IMPLICATIONS AND PROBLEMS RAISED BY
O'CALLAHAN
A. SHoUm) O'Callahan BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY?
Apparently the chief concern of the Department of Defense
at present is whether O'Calahan will be applied retroactively.195
When the decision was rendered, the Army Judge Advocate
General stated that the Army had exercised the jurisdiction
denied the military in O'Callahan for 180 years, 96 and estimated
that since 1951 the Army alone had conducted 450,000 courts-
martial which might be invalid under O'Callahan.197 He stated
193. 18 U.S.C. § 1 (3) (1964).
194. The military services have broad power to discharge personnel
administratively under less than honorable conditions for unsuitability,
unfitness and misconduct. See, e.g., AnRvy REG. 635-212. Other services
have comparable provisions. See generally Dougherty & Lynch, The
Administrative Discharge: Military Justice?, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 498
(1964).
195. For a general discussion of the problem of retroactivity, see
Currier, Time and Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Over-
ruling, 51 VA. L. REv. 201 (1965); Mlishkin, The Supreme Court, 1964
Term, Foreword: The High Court, The Great Writ, and the Due Process
of Time and Law, 79 IIARv. L. REv. 56 (1965); The Supreme Court, 1965
Term, 80 HARv. L. REV. 91, 135 (1966); Note, Linkletter, Shott, and the
Retroactivity Problem in Escobedo, 64 MicH. L. REv. 832 (1965); Note,
Prospective Overruling and Retroactive Application in the Federal
Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907 (1962). The problem is not just a question
whether a decision shall be wholly prospective or wholly retrospective.
There are degrees of retroactivity and the line is drawn at different
places in different cases. See Bender, The Retroactive Effect of an
Overruling Decision: Mapp v. Ohio, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 650, 673-78
(1962); Rogers, Perspectives on Prospective Overruling, 36 U. Mo. K.C.
L. REV. 35, 57-63 (1968).
196. The Washington Evening Star, June 6, 1969, at A-3.
197. Id. The account of Judge Advocate General Hodson's remarks
carried by the Chicago Tribune states that Hodson said that 1.3 million
men in the Army alone had been court-martialed since 1951. Chicago
Tribune, June 1, 1969, § 1, at 11. The two statements are not in con-
flict on their face, of course. Any estimate of the number of courts-
martial that would be invalidated under O'Callahan is purely a matter
of speculation at the moment. In any event it seems clear that large
numbers of courts-martial will come into question.
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that the Army, Navy and Air Force together have approximately
4,000 men in prison,198 and that suits would not be limited to
those in prison because presumably actions would be filed re-
lating to other punishments and involving back pay, veterans'
benefits and burial in military cemeteries. 199 The sheer num-
bers involved suggest that a retroactive application of O'Callahan
would create staggering problems for the military. Moreover,
civilian courts would likely be burdened by collateral attack
proceedings and retrials.
Prior to the Supreme Court's 1965 decision in Linkletter v.
Walker,20 0 decisions establishing new principles of constitutional
law were applied retroactively as a matter of course.20 ' In
Linkletter the court declined to apply Mapp v. Ohio,20 2 which
ruled that evidence obtained in violation of the fourth amend-
ment is inadmissible in state criminal proceedings, to any
cases which were not on direct appeal at the time of the Mapp
decision. Writing for the majority, Justice Clark declared:
[W]e believe that the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires
retrospective effect.
... We must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each
case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question,
its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will
further or retard its operation.203
The Linkletter principle has been adhered to in a series of cases
in which full retroactive effect was denied to new constitutional
rules. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,20 4 decided in 1966,
denied general retroactive effect to Griffin v. California,205
which forbade comment by either prosecutor or court on a
defendant's failure to testify at a state trial. Shortly after the
decision in Tehan, Johnson v. New Jersey20- 6 denied full retro-
active effect to Escobedo v. Illinois2 ° 7 and Miranda v. Arizona,208
which held inadmissible certain statements by defendants in an
effort to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-
198. The Washington Evening Star, June 6, 1969, at A-3.
199. On suits in the Court of Claims for back pay, see United States
v. Augenblick, 393 U.S. 348 (1969); United States v. Brown, 206 U.S.
240 (1907); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897).
200. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
201. Note, Linkletter, Shott, and the Retroactivity Problem, supra
note 195.
202. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
203. 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965).
204. 382 U.S. 406 (1966).
205. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
206. 384 U.S. 719 (1966).
207. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
208. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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incrimination. In Stovall v. Denno,20 9 the Court was faced with
the question whether the decisions in United States v. Wade210
and Gilbert v. Caliornia ll were to be applied retroactively.
These decisions required the exclusion of evidence which was
tainted because the accused was exhibited before trial to identi-
fying witnesses in the absence of counsel. In an opinion deny-
ing retroactive effect, Justice Brennan summarized the test:
The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicate (a)
the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent
of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old stand-
ards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a
retroactive application of the new standards. 212
The closest case to O'Callahan on the issue of retroactivity is
De Stefano v. Woods.213 In that case the Court held per cur-
iam that the right to jury trial announced in Duncan v. Louisi-
ana214 and Bloom v. Illinois215 was inapplicable to trials begun
prior to the date of the Court's decisions in those cases. Since the
most important reason for the holding in O'Callahan was the
absence of the right to trial by jury, the analogy to De Stefano
is apparent. Yet, as Justice Clark pointed out in Linkletter, each
case must be weighed individually, so that simply to observe
that both O'Callahan and De Stefano dealt with the right to trial
by jury is insufficient.
The first consideration mentioned by Justice Brennan in
Stovall was "the purpose to be served by the new standards."
It has been suggested elsewhere that the answer to this question
depends on how the purpose is defined. 210  While on the sur-
face this appears to be a truism, it takes on added meaning when
combined with the suggestion that the Court has modified the
reasoning of original decisions whenever that reasoning would
support general retroactivity.21 7 The "purpose of the new stand-
209. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
210. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
211. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
212. 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967).
213. 392 U.S. 631 (1968). Other recent decisions on retroactivity
include McConnel v. Rhay, 393 U.S. 2 (1968), and Arsenault v. Mas-
sachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968), both of which applied decisions involving
right to counsel retroactively, and Fuller v. Alaska, 393 U.S. 80 (1968),
which denied retroactive application to a decision holding inadmissible
in state criminal trials evidence violative of § 605 of the Federal Com-
munications Act. Each of these decisions was by per curiam opinion.
214. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
215. 391 U.S. 194 (1968) (right to jury trial exists in trials for serious
criminal contempt).
216. The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 IHARv. L. REv. 91, 139 (1966).
217. Id. at 138. It can be argued that once it is found that the
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ards" is most persuasive as a reason for giving general retro-
active effect when the standard in question relates to the fairness
or reliability of the trial.218 As Justice Clark explained in Link-
letter, "[I] n each of the three areas in which we have applied our
rule retrospectively the principle that we applied went to the
fairness of the trial-the very integrity of the fact-finding proc-
ess.,,219
Applying the "purpose" test in De Stefano to the jury trial
standards laid down in Duncan and Bloom, the Court observed:
Duncan held that the States must respect the right to jury
trial because in the context of the institutions and practices by
which we adopt and apply our criminal laws, the right to jury
trial generally tends to prevent arbitrariness and repression.
As we stated in Duncan, 'We would not assert, however, that
every criminal trial-or any particular trial-held before a judge
alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly
treated by a judge as he would be by a jury." . . . The values
implemented by the right to jury trial would not measurably
be served by requiring retrial of all persons convicted in the
past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial.220
As one might expect of a per curiam opinion, the treatment of
the "purpose" test in the above quotation is not a searching
analysis of the problem; but it seems to suggest that since a
trial before a judge is not inherently less reliable than a jury
trial, the values of the sixth amendment would not be served
by requiring a retrial of all persons convicted in the past by
procedures not consistent with the sixth amendment. This
raises the question whether trial by courts-martial should re-
ceive the same treatment as a trial before a civilian judge. To
put it somewhat differently, is a trial by court-martial as fair
a process as a trial before a civilian judge? The various epithets
used by Justice Douglas in the O'Callahan opinion in referring to
military justice make it fairly clear that he would answer the
question in the negative. On the other hand, many writers
purpose of a new rule will be advanced by retroactive application, the
court should not consider reliance and impact, the second and third
factors announced in Stovall. See Note, Constitutional Rules of Crim-
inal Procedure and the Application of Linkletter, 16 J. PuB. LAW 193,
209-12 (1967). However, the discussion in this section proceeds on the
assumption that no single factor is in itself determinative, but is to be
weighed along with the other factors.
218. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965). See the dis-
cussion in Note, supra note 201, at 842-49. For criticism of the reliabil-
ity test, see Schwartz, Retroactivity, Reliability, and Due Process: A
Reply to Professor Mishkin, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 719, 724-42 (1966).
219. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639 (1965).
220. De Stefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633-34 (1968).
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believe that the procedural protections accorded the accused in
military proceedings are now superior to those provided in civil
courts and that the military fact-finding process is very reliable
indeed.221 The chief difference between military and civilian
proceedings at this time probably is the possibility of command
influence, 222 and one's conclusion on this issue may very well
turn on his assessment of the extent and seriousness of this
factor. Insufficient empirical evidence exists to speak with com-
plete assurance on the relative reliability of the two systems.
The second consideration mentioned by Justice Brennan in
Stovall was "the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards." It is clear that both the
Congress and military authorities have relied on the old juris-
dictional concepts. Congress' reliance is indicated by the fact
that jurisdiction over civilian offenses has been premised on the
status of membership in the armed forces since 1916 .22 Rely-
ing on Congressional enactments and dicta in numerous de-
cisions, military authorities have not made a systematic attempt
to develop a record in courts-martial to show "service-connec-
tion," thus leaving thousands of past cases open to collateral
attack if O'Caflahan is applied retroactively.
In applying this second part of the Stovall test to the
Duncan and Bloom cases, the court stated in De Stefano that,
"States undoubtedly relied in good faith upon the past opinions
of this court to the effect that the Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial was not applicable to the states." 224 As previously noted, the
Supreme Court has stated on numerous occasions that servicemen
are subject to court-martial jurisdiction on the basis of their
status as servicemen, without regard to the offense.2 25  Conse-
quently, the reliance by Congress and the military undoubtedly
was in good faith.
The third and final consideration in the Stovall test is
"the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive
application of the new standards." The De Stefano court stated
that:
[T]he effect of a holding of general retroactivity on law en-
forcement and the administration of justice would be significant,
because the denial of jury trial has occurred in a very great
221. See text accompanying note 303 infra.
222. See text accompanying note 302 infra.
223. See text accompanying notes 105-16 supra.
224. De Stefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 634 (1968).
225. See text accompanying notes 131-37 supra.
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number of cases in those states not until now accepting the
Sixth Amendment guarantee.226
The emphasis here is on the number of prior convictions that
would be placed in jeopardy if the decision is given retroactive
effect. It also seems important to consider the difficulty of
reprosecution of individuals whose convictions are over-
turned.227 The Government's brief in O'Callahan stated that if
the rule sought by petitioner had been applied from 1966 to the
present, twenty percent of the "non-military" offenses tried
in military courts would instead have been within the juris-
diction of the civil authorities.2 28 Because of the inherent vague-
ness of the O'Callahan test, it is probably impossible to esti-
mate accurately the percentage of prior convictions that could
be challenged. Moreover, all of the challenged convictions that
cannot meet the test will be overturned since the defect, being
jurisdictional, goes to the competency of the court. Nor will
the number of challenges be limited by the number of service-
men in confinement, inasmuch as suits for honorable dis-
charges and back pay could also be brought. When one con-
siders the fact that 1.3 million men have been court-martialed
in the Army alone since 1951,229 the staggering number of cases
subject to challenge is apparent. As to the difficulty of re-
prosecution, the rapid turnover in military personnel and the
fact that military people are transferred frequently renders the
gathering of witnesses and evidence even more difficult than
the already formidable task faced in this regard by civil courts.
It is an understatement, therefore, to say that retroactive appli-
cation of O'Callahan would have a seriously adverse effect on
the administration of the military justice system.
One further point must be considered. O'Caltahan dealt
with a jurisdictional defect, and the question thus arises whether
the fact that the new standard is jurisdictional necessitates a
retroactive application of the "service-connected" test. The most
obvious place to begin an examination of this question is Link-
letter v. Walker,2 0 since it spawned the recent series of de-
cisions which refused to give general retroactive effect to cases
226. De Stefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 634 (1968).
227. Note, Linkletter, Shot and the RetroactivitV Problem, supra
note 195, at 841.
228. Brief for Respondent United States at 29 n.1.8, O'Callahan v.
Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
229. See note 197 supra.
230. 381 U.S. 618 (1965). For a discussion of retroactivity of changes
in jurisdiction by the NLRB, see Berger, Retroactive Administrative
Decisions, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 371, 385-89 (1967).
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establishing new principles. In that case Justice Clark con-
cluded that the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retro-
spective effect and that each case must be examined separately.
There is nothing in this broad principle that would seem to re-
quire retroactivity as a matter of course simply because the new
standard involves jurisdiction. One might object that a juris-
dictional defect means that a tribunal had no power to proceed
at all and that a defect so fundamental must be held to relate
back. But to assume that the tribunal had no power to proceed
one has also to assume that O'Callahan did not make new law,
discovering instead the law that always existed though thereto-
fore unexpressed. This assumption, with its roots in Black-
stone's Commentarie, 23 was rejected in Linkletter v. Walker.
The theory was . . . that a change of judicial decision after a
contract has been made on the faith of an earlier one the
other way is a change of the law ... the actual existence of the
law prior to the determination of unconstitutionality "is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly
be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new ju-
dicial declaration."232
It is thus both possible and appropriate to test court-martial
jurisdiction by the standards that existed at the time the pro-
ceeding was held, and to assume that standards once valid are
now no longer valid.
Although it is hornbook law that jurisdictional defects can
be collaterally attacked because of the fundamental nature of
such defects,233 this policy is sometimes subordinated to others.
For example, in civil cases the bootstrap doctrine sometimes pre-
vents jurisdictional attacks because the issue of jurisdiction has
already been litigated.23 4 In other words, the policy permitting
collateral attack of civil judgments must sometimes give way to
the policy that litigation should come to an end at some point.
Therefore, simply calling the problem one of "jurisdiction" does
not solve the problem. The chameleon-like quality of this term is
illustrated by the fact that in delineating the scope of habeas
corpus review the Supreme Court has labeled such issues as the
right to counsel "jurisdictional. 235 Different policies are rele-
231. 1 BLACKSTONE, CoIMnMENTARIES *69 (1769).
232. 381 U.S. 618, 624-25 (1965).
233. R. LEFLAI, An incAN CONFIaCTS LAw § 80 (2d ed. 1968).
234. See generally Dobbs, Beyond Bootstrap: Foreclosing the Issue
of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Before Final Judgment, 51 Mlm. L.
REv. 491 (1967); Dobbs, The Validation of Void Judgments: The Boot-
strap Principle, 53 VA. L. REv. 1003 (1967); Dobbs, The Scope of the
Bootstrap Principle, 53 VA. L. REv. 1241 (1967).
235. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). See text accompanying
notes 238-39 infra.
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vant to the analysis of different issues of jurisdiction, and there
is no valid reason why the question of retroactivity of the O'Cal-
lahan principle cannot be analyzed in terms of the test estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Stovall and De Stefano.
Assuming that the fact that O'Callahan dealt with juris-
diction will not dictate a retroactive effect, an application of the
tests laid down by the Court in Stovall should lead to a decision
that O'Ca~lahan will not be applied retroactively. The second
and third parts of the test are clearly satisfied. Whether the
"purpose" factor is satisfied depends on how it is defined and,
in the final analysis, on a value judgment with respect to the
military justice system. Yet however the "purpose" issue is re-
solved, the enormous problems indicated by the second and
third parts of the Stovall standard are enough to justify denial
of retroactive application.
B. AN EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES PROBLEM
Since O'Callahan inevitably will encourage collateral attacks
on future court-martial judgments, some analysis of collateral
review of military judgments is necessary. Until 1938, the
scope of review in federal habeas corpus actions, the usual mode
of collateral review, 236 was roughly the same regardless of
whether the judgment reviewed was civilian or military. The
test applied was whether the court had jurisdiction over the
person and the offense charged, and whether the sentence was
authorized by law.237 In 1938, the scope of review in civilian
cases was extended in Johnson v. Zerbst,238 which held that a
court would lose jurisdiction if it failed to provide counsel as re-
quired by the sixth amendment. By 1944, jurisdiction in the nar-
row sense was no longer the sole consideration; rather, the
Supreme Court concluded that habeas corpus "extends also to
236. For a consideration of other modes of collateral review of
courts-martial, see Fratcher, Review By the Civil Courts of Judgments
of Federal Military Tribunas, 10 Omio ST. L.J. 271, 272 (1949); Sherman,
Judicial Review of Military Determinations and the Exhaustion of Rem-
edies Requirement, 55 VA. L. REv. 483, 537 (1969); Snedeker, Habeas
Corpus and Court-Martial Prisoners, 6 VAN. L. REV. 288, 292 (1953).
237. See Bishop, Civilian Judges and Military Justice: Collateral
Review of Court-Martial Convictions, 61 COLum. L. REv. 40, 43-44, 49-50
(1961); Katz & Nelson, The Need for Clarification in Military Habeas
Corpus, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 193, 197 (1966). Compare Ex parte Reed, 100
U.S. 13, 23 (1879) with In re Gregory, 219 U.S. 210, 213 (1911). For a
thorough discussion of the traditional jurisdictional concepts applied in
military habeas corpus cases, see Fratcher, supra note 236.
238. 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
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those exceptional cases where the conviction had been in dis-
regard of the constitutional rights of the accused, and where the
writ is the only effective means of preserving his rights."239
The scope of review of civilian habeas corpus was expanded fur-
ther during the ensuing two decades and now the federal dis-
trict judge need have few, if any, qualms about inquiring into
the constitutional defects of a state or federal civilian con-
viction.240 Habeas corpus is available in a federal court when-
ever the state proceeding fails to meet the standards of pro-
cedural fairness required of the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment.241 The scope of habeas corpus review of courts-martial
has not experienced a similar expansion. Although the several
opinions of the 1953 decision of Burns v. Wilson242 indicate that
federal courts in habeas corpus cases may review claims of
denial of due process in court-martial proceedings, the case as
applied has not notably expanded the scope of collateral review
beyond the traditional jurisdictional concepts. 243
O'Callahan, perhaps ironically, will increase habeas corpus
review not in the area of its greatest recent expansion in the
civilian cases, constitutional due process defects at trial, but
rather in the pre-Johnson area of jurisdiction over the subject
matter or offense. Since "status" is no longer the sole criteria
for jurisdiction by the military over its members, every court-
martial raising the slightest doubt as to "service connection"
represents a potential habeas corpus action in the federal courts.
Every serviceman held in detention after a court-martial deter-
mination of jurisdiction under the new test could very well
view federal habeas corpus as a possible escape from the proc-
ess of military law. This potential for disruption of the tra-
ditional process of court-martial review should be cause for
considerable concern by the military and federal district courts
charged with hearing habeas corpus petitions. In this respect,
the doctrine of exhaustion of military remedies could play a
crucial role.
A requirement of exhaustion of military remedies as a pre-
requisite to federal habeas corpus was approved almost twenty
years ago in Gusik v. Schider.244 In that case the petitioner
239. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
240. See Katz & Nelson, supra note 237, at 193-94.
241. C. WRIGHT, FEERA CouRTs 180 (1963).
242. 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
243. See Katz & Nelson, supra note 237, at 194, 212.
244. 340 U.S. 128 (1950). See Sherman, supra note 236, at 500-01.
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was convicted of murder by a court-martial and sought a writ
of habeas corpus on the grounds that the court-martial denied
him statutory and constitutional rights to a pre-trial investiga-
tion and effective assistance of counsel. The petitioner had
not pursued the collateral review afforded him under the stat-
utory predecessor of Article 73 of the UCMJ.245  The Court
ruled that the district court should refuse to hear the case prior
to petitioner's exhaustion of his military remedies. The Court,
per Justice Douglas, analogized the situation to state-federal
habeas corpus practice, pointing out that interference of a fed-
eral court may be a needless irritant if the military offers a
remedy.246
Gusik was reaffirmed this year by the Supreme Court in
Noyd v. Bond.247  In that case, the petitioner, an Air Force
captain, had been found guilty by a general court-martial of
willful disobedience of a lawful order and was sentenced to
one year's confinement, forfeiture of all pay and allowances,
and dismissal from the Air Force. The petitioner was ordered
confined pending appellate review. While appealing the con-
viction to the Air Force Board of Review, petitioner sought a
writ of habeas corpus from a federal district court claiming
that his confinement pending review violated certain pro-
visions of the UCMJ.248  The district court granted the writ,
rejecting the government's exhaustion of remedies argument on
the ground that the military court system did not provide a
method of testing the legality of his confinement pending
appeal.249 The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, relying
on Gusik, reversed, holding that petitioner could not obtain
habeas corpus relief until he had first challenged the validity of
the confinement before appellate tribunals within the military
system.250 The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals
by a 7 to 1 vote, holding that since the petitioner had not at-
tempted to show that prompt and effective relief was unavailable
from the Court of Military Appeals, his failure to exhaust that
remedy before seeking habeas corpus in civilian courts was not
excused.25 1
245. See note 264 infra.
246. Gusik v. Schilder, 340 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1950).
247. 395 U.S. 683, (1969).
248. UCMJ art. 71(c), 10 U.S.C. § 871 (c) (1964); UCMJ art. 13,
10 U.S.C. § 813 (1964).
249. Noyd v. Bond, 285 F. Supp. 785 (D.C.N.M. 1968).
250. Noyd v. Bond, 402 F.2d 441 (10th Cir. 1968).
251. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, (1969). Justice Black concurred
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Justice Harlan's opinion in Noyd reiterated the state-mili-
tary habeas corpus analogy of Gusik and stressed the fact that
Congress purposely "chose to confide the power to review mil-
itary justice to a specialized Court of Military Appeals, so that
disinterested civilian judges could gain over time a fully de-
veloped understanding of the distinctive problems and legal
traditions of the Armed Forces. " 252  The Court found the
principles of Gusik especially applicable to the case before it.
Military courts could very well vindicate petitioner's claim and
render civilian review unnecessary.2 3 The exhaustion require-
ment, according to the Court, would avoid needless friction that
would arise if civilian courts are required to review first level
military decisions. 25 4  Finally, the Court would avoid inter-
preting extremely technical provisions of the UCMJ, at least
until the Court of Military Appeals had offered its interpre-
tation.2 55 Interestingly, the tone of the Noyd opinion, which
was issued only two weeks after O'Callahan, could not be more
strikingly different than O'Callahan in the deference and sophis-
tication displayed toward military courts as a judicial system.
The major question, of course, is whether the Gusik ex-
haustion requirement is applicable to habeas corpus proceedings
raising jurisdictional issues under O'Callahan. In Noyd, the
petitioner also contended that he should not be required to ex-
haust military remedies because exhaustion was not required
in three previous cases holding that the Constitution barred
peacetime court-martial jurisdiction over various classes of civil-
ians connected with the military.258 The petitioner was correct
in the sense that in each of the three cases the Supreme Court
passed on the merits without considering the exhaustion prob-
lem, although in one case the Court noted that the defendant
was being held pending a proposed retrial by court-martial.257
However, in one of the cases, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals had fully considered the issue and had con-
cluded that exhaustion was not required because the accused
in the result. Justice White dissented on the ground that the petition
for certiorari should have been dismissed as improvidently granted.
Id. at 699.
252. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 694 (1969).
253. Id. at 696.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1
(1957); McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281
(1960). See text accompanying notes 127-30 supra.
257. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 4, (1957).
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was a civilian and therefore "[t]he question is whether appellant
is subject to court-martial jurisdiction at all."25  The Court
distinguished Gusik on the grounds that the accused there was
in the military and sought habeas corpus because of alleged
errors in the court-martial procedure, not because of any ques-
tion going to the court-martial's jurisdiction. The Court con-
cluded that if the government had no court-martial jurisdiction
whatever over the appellant, habeas corpus would be available
to release him from custody.25 9 As mentioned, the Supreme
Court did not refer to this issue on appeal. However, in what
may become a significant footnote, the Supreme Court in Noyd
met the petitioner's contention with language somewhat similar
to that used by the Court of Appeals in the earlier case.
It is true that this Court [in the earlier cases] vindicated peti-
tioners' claims without requiring exhaustion of military rem-
edies. We did so, however, because we did not believe that
the expertise of military courts extended to the consideration
of constitutional claims of the type presented. Moreover, it
appeared especially unfair to require exhaustion of military
remedies when the petitioners raised substantial arguments
denying the right of the military to try them at all. Neither
of these factors is present in the case before us.260
In reality, the allegation in an O'Callahan situation will be
a lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense on the
basis that the offense is not "service-connected." However, by
applying the Noyd approach, in part by analogy, the exhaustion
of military remedies should be required. Since the petitioner in
an O'Callahan situation will almost always be a serviceman, the
allegation cannot be that military courts have no jurisdiction "at
all" or "whatever" because, unlike the case where the petitioner
is a peacetime civilian, the military status of the accused will
result in court-martial jurisdiction if the offense is "service-con-
nected."261
It is submitted that, to permit the serviceman to use habeas
corpus prior to exhaustion is to discount unjustifiably the avail-
ability and value of the fairly complete military appellate and
258. United States v. McElroy, 259 F.2d 927, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1958)
(emphasis added).
259. Id.
260. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 696 n.8 (1969) (emphasis added).
261. In fact, the Seventh Circuit has specifically ruled that a con-
victed serviceman was required to exhaust his military remedies, even
though one allegation was that the military did not have jurisdiction over
the offense. In that case, the allegation was that the court-martial had
no jurisdiction over a capital offense in time of peace. Branford v.
United States, 356 F.2d 876, 877 (7th Cir. 1966).
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collateral review procedure provided by the UCMJ. Depending
on the type of court-martial and the sentence adjudged, a
court-martial conviction will be reviewed by one or more of the
following agencies: the convening authority of the court-
martial or his superior in command; the office of the Judge
Advocate General; Service Courts of Military Review; the United
States Court of Military Appeals, a three-judge civilian court
created by Congress to be the final appellate court in the mil-
itary system; the Secretaries of the military departments; and
the President.26 2  Final appellate review of most convictions
generally will be by one of the first three of the above-men-
tioned agencies. The United States Court of Military Appeals
automatically reviews death sentences, convictions involving
general or flag officers, and those cases certified to it by the
Judge Advocate General.263 That court also exercises a sub-
stantial discretionary power of review akin to the certiorari juris-
diction of the United States Supreme Court, and this jurisdiction
represents the bulk of the caseload.2 4 Moreover, the Court of
Military Appeals has recently held that it has the power to issue
writs of habeas corpus.265 The issue of "service-connection" is
especially suited to the expertise of military courts and the
United States Court of Military Appeals; this is not so, as Justice
Harlan points out, in the purely civilian cases. By requiring
exhaustion, the federal district courts, before having to tackle
the question of "service-connection," will in many cases have
before them expert judgment of several echelons of military
tribunals and often that of the Court of Military Appeals. While
262. See UCMJ arts. 59-76, 10 U.S.C. §§ 859-76 (1964).
263. UCMJ art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1964).
264. UCMJ art. 67(b) (3), 10 U.S.C. § 867(b) (3) (1964). An
examination of volume 38 of the Court-Martial Reports indicates that
during 1967-68, the vast majority of the decisions reached by the Court
of Military Appeals on the merits resulted from this discretionary juris-
diction. Over 60 percent of the cases accepted pursuant to this pro-
vision were reversed.
In addition, the Judge Advocate General is invested with a limited
form of military collateral review under Article 73, which reads:
At any time within one year after approval by the convening
authority of a court-martial sentence .. . , the accused may
petition the Judge Advocate General for a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence or fraud on the court.
If the accused's case is pending before the board of review or
before the Court of Military Appeals, the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral shall refer the petition to the [appropriate] .. .court ...
for action. Otherwise the Judge Advocate General shall act
upon the petition.
UCMJ art. 73, 10 U.S.C. § 873 (1964).
265. Levy v. Resor, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 135, 37 C.M.R. 399 (1967).
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such determinations are not binding on the civilian federal courts
in habeas corpus actions,266 they nevertheless provide helpful
guidelines. Moreover, such an approach will to a great extent
obviate the problems inherent in interpreting "a legal tradition
which is radically different from that which is common in
civil courts. '267
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR CIVILIANS "IN TE FIELD"
Certain language in O'Caflahan, whether intentional or in-
advertent, raises a substantial doubt as to the constitutionality
of the extension of military jurisdiction under Article 2, section
10 of the UCMJ to civilians with the armed forces "in the field"
in "time of war. 2 68 While this issue is collateral to the subject
matter of this article, its timeliness compels a brief consider-
ation of the problem.
The doubts are raised by the following language in the
majority opinion:
We have held in a series of decisions that court-martial juris-
diction cannot be extended to reach any person not a member
of the Armed Forces at the times of both the offense and the
trial .... Similarly, neither civilian employees of the Armed
Forces overseas, . . . nor civilian dependents of military per-
sonnel accompanying them overseas,.., may be tried by court-
martial. [cases omitted]
These cases decide that courts-martial have no jurisdiction
to try those who are not members of the Armed Forces, no
matter how intimate the connection between their offense and
the concerns of military discipline.26 9
Thereafter in the opinion, the Court mentioned that "courts-
martial have no jurisdiction over non-soldiers, whatever their
offense . *... "27 Taken literally, this language would simply
266. The doctrine of res judicata does not bar habeas corpus. See
C. WRIGHT, supra note 241, at 182.
267. Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683 (1969). One question not con-
sidered in this discussion, assuming that the exhaustion doctrine applies
in the O'Callahan situation, is whether exhaustion is necessary where
there are remedies which a petitioner might have pursued in the past,
but which are no longer open to him. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391
(1963). In both Gusik and Noyd the Court used the words "which,
though available, has not been exhausted" and "presently available,"
in analogizing to the state-federal exhaustion requirement. This would
indicate that the exhaustion doctrine would be applicable only where
there are presently existing military remedies. In any event, it would
appear that the exhaustion doctrine would be available against a
petitioner who deliberately bypassed military remedies. See Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 439 (1963).
268. UCMJ art. 2(10), 10 U.S.C. § 802(10) (1964).
269. 395 U.S. at 267 (emphasis added).
270. Id.
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negate court-martial jurisdiction over civilians, no matter what
the circumstances, whether during war or peace. If the Court
incorporated this dictum in a future holding, it would seem that
any attempt to exercise court-martial jurisdiction under Article
2, section 10 of the UCMJ would be doomed to failure. Such a
result would dispose of serious threshold questions that pre-
viously have occupied scholars, such as whether, for these pur-
poses, the Vietnam conflict is a "war"2 71 and what is contem-
plated by the language "in the field."272  If all court-martial
jurisdiction over civilians is constitutionally impermissible, there
is no need to fret about construction of the statute which pur-
ports to define such jurisdiction.
The cases relied upon by the O'Callahan majority to buttress
its statement 2 3 clearly do not compel such an all-encompassing
proposition. Toth v. Quarles27 4 simply stands for the propo-
sition that court-martial jurisdiction is unconstitutional as to
persons, who, although subject to the UCMJ at the time of the
commission of the offense, later cease to occupy that status.
The other cases dealt not with Article 2, section 10, but with
Article 2, section 11 of the UCMJ.275  Moreover, although the
cases invalidated military jurisdiction over civilians accompany-
ing the military,276 they were concerned with peacetime courts-
martial;2 77 the "urgency of wartime" as Chief Justice Warren
pointed out elsewhere, was absent.27 8 The cases did not pur-
port to invalidate previous decisions upholding court-martial
jurisdiction over civilians serving with or accompanying the
271. See, e.g., Wiener, Courts-Martial for Civilians Accompanying
the Armed Forces in Vietnam, 54 A.B.A.J. 24, 25-26 (1968) for a
thoughtful analysis of the meaning of "in time of war." The Court's
language could also render unnecessary much of the valuable analysis
of that phrase in the context of Article 2, section 10 of the UCMJ found
in Note, "In Time of War" Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice:
An Elusive Standard, 67 MICH. L. Rav. 841 (1969).
272. See, e.g., W. AYcocK & S. WURFEL, MiLiTAxy LAw UNDER THE
UNIORM CODE OF MMITARY JUSTICE 58 (1955).
273. McElroy v. United States ex rel. Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281(1960); Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960); Grisham v. Hagan,
361 U.S. 278 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Toth v. Quarles,
350 U.S. 11 (1955).
274. 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
275. UCMJ art. 2(11), 10 U.S.C. § 802(11) (1964).
276. See text accompanying notes 128-38 supra.
277. See Wiener, supra note 271; The Supreme Court, 1959 Term,
74 HAuv. L. REV. 81, 116-17 (1960); Note, supra note 271, at 843; J.
MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, f 0.5[3.-5] at 152-53 (1964).
278. Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REV.
181, 195 (1962).
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military in the field in time of war.279 In fact, as one scholar
has pointed out, "from the time of our nation's birth to the
present, there has been little doubt that such persons are con-
stitutionally amenable to military law.1280
Nevertheless, less than four weeks after O'Caflahan, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia quoted part of
the O'Callahan dictum as partial justification for its decision
in Latney v. Ignatius.28 1 In that case, Latney was arrested by
military police in Da Nang, South Vietnam, and was charged by
the military with premeditated murder in a local bar. Both
the accused and the victim were civilian American merchant sea-
men serving aboard an American-ovned tanker under charter
to the United States Navy. Latney was tried and convicted of
murder as charged by a court-martial. A federal district court
denied his request for habeas corpus, holding that section 10 was
constitutional and that Latney was a person "serving with or
accompanying an armed force in the field in time of war,)28 2
and thus subject to jurisdiction under that section. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed, relying to
some extent on the O'Callahan dictum quoted above that
"[C] ourts-martial have no jurisdiction to try those who are not
members of the Armed Forces, no matter how intimate the
connection between their offense and the concerns of military
discipline., 28 3
279. Note, supra note 271, at 843. For examples of such decisions,
see Peristein v. United States, 151 F.2d 167 (3d Cir. 1945), cert.
granted, 327 U.S. 777, cert. denied, 328 U.S. 822 (1946); Hammond v.
Squier, 51 F. Supp. 227 (D.D.C. 1943). In fact, the plurality opinion
in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) expressly approved the statement
that "a statute cannot be framed by which a civilian can lawfully be
made amenable to the military jurisdiction in time of peace." Id. at 35.
280. J. MooRE, FmmuL PRAcTIcE 0.5[3.-5] at 153 (2d ed. 1964).
281. 38 U.S.L.W. 2015 (1969).
282. Id.
283. Id. See text accompanying note 269 supra. At the time this
article was written, a full text of the Latney opinion was unavailable.
However, the court appears alternatively to have applied the O'Callahan
"service-connected" test and found that Latney, a civilian, should not
be tried by court-martial under section 10 because the crime was not
"service-connected." There may be some merit to this reasoning because
if a serviceman can be tried by the military only for "service-connected"
offenses, then a fortiori, the same rule should apply to civilians. On the
other hand, it would seem that if an accused is "in the field" "in time
of war" within the meaning of section 10, the offense is "service-con-
nected." See text accompanying notes 159-66 supra.
The section 10 issue is squarely presented in another very recent
court-martial arising out of the Vietnam conflict. The defendant in
that case was charged with involuntary manslaughter and assault with
a dangerous weapon and was convicted by a general court-martial.
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It may well be that the O'Callahan dictum was inadvertent
and was not intended to invalidate section 10 in such summary
fashion. Arguably, the statements were prefatory remarks to
fortify the central conclusion that military status alone is not
enough to assure court-martial jurisdiction. Yet it is apparent
that at least the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
finds some substance in the statement. In any event, the Su-
preme Court clearly should not feel bound by the dictum in
future litigation over section 10, since it is almost axiomatic that
a new constitutional principle is better established after a full
consideration of the issues in the context of a fact situation
fairly raising it. 284 But one cannot ignore the possibility that the
Court's assertion adumbrates future restrictions on court-
martial jurisdiction.
D. EFFECT ON A DOUBLE JEOPARDY PROBLEM
O'Callahan will alleviate to some extent a double jeopardy
problem inherent in the overlapping criminal jurisdictions of
our federal system. Under the double jeopardy provision of the
fifth amendment, the acquittal or conviction of an accused for
an offense in a court deriving its jurisdiction from the United
States bars a subsequent trial for the same offense in another
court deriving its jurisdiction from the same source.2 5 Since
courts-martial and federal courts derive their power and juris-
diction from the federal government, a serviceman may not be
The charges arose out of the death of one American soldier and the
wounding of two others during a drinking spree. The defendant, a
young civilian, was employed in Vietnam by a concern that repaired
battle-damaged helicopters pursuant to a contract with the United States
Government. At trial, the military judge accepted the argument of
counsel for the Government that military jurisdiction under Article 2,
section 10 of the UCMJ was constitutional. New York Times, April 17,
1969, at 5, col. 1.
284. Another situation possibly affected by the O'Caflahan dictum
but not considered here is whether a military commission or court-
martial has jurisdiction to try civilians who are spies or who aid the
enemy. The dictum would prohibit this if construed literally, but it
seems unlikely that the Court intended to overrule Ex parte Quirin, 317
U.S. 1 (1942).
285. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333, 352 (1906). A consid-
eration of what constitutes the "same offense" for double jeopardy pur-
poses is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of this
problem, see Fisher, Double Jeopardy: Two Sovereignties and the
Intruding Constitution, 28 U. Cm. L. REv. 591, 597, 604-05, 608-12 (1961).
See also In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889). The UCMJ also contains a
double jeopardy provision. UCMJ art. 44(a), 10 U.S.C. § 844 (a)(1964). For an interesting interpretation of what constitutes the "same
offense" under the latter article, see MAuuAx. 215b at 29-2.
19691
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tried in both courts for the same offense.280 Thus, if a service-
man commits an assault on a federal reservation where the
federal government has exclusive jurisdiction, he would be sub-
ject to trial and conviction by either a federal court or a court-
martial, but not by both.287 On the other hand, where a service-
man's conduct constitutes an offense under both military and
state law, an acquittal or conviction in either a state court or a
court-martial generally does not bar a subsequent trial in the
other.28  This principle is based on the constitutional doctrine
that state and federal courts derive their existence and juris-
diction from "separate sovereigns.1289 After O'Callahan, how-
ever, a serviceman who commits an offense which is not "service-
connected" will be amenable only to civilian jurisdiction and thus
the danger of being tried in both a military and state tribunal
is eliminated.
VII. REFLECTIONS ON THE MAJORITY OPINION
A literal reading of clause 14 and the fifth amendment
exception for cases arising in the land and naval forces suggests
that Congress, not the Supreme Court, has the responsibility for
placing limits on the jurisdiction of courts-martial to try mem-
bers of the armed services. Since few would argue that the
Court should decide cases without careful respect for the terms
of the Constitution,2 90 it follows that those who argue for a result
that seems to be contrary to a fair reading of the language of
286. Grafton v. United States, 206 U.S. 333 (1906); Everett, Persons
Who Can Be Tried by Court-Martial, 5 J. PuB. L. 148, 167; Merriam &
Thornton, Double Jeopardy and the Court-Martial, 19 BRoom L. REv. 62,
67-68 (1952); Duke & Vogel, The Constituiion and the Standing Army:
Another Problem of Court-Martial Jurisdiction, 13 VAm. L. REV. 435, 454
(1960).
287. Duke & Vogel, supra note 286, at 454.
288. E.g., Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S. 509, 513 (1878); In re
Stubbs, 133 F. 1012 (C.C. Wash. 1905); Everett, supra note 286, at 166.
289. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959); Bartkus v.
United States, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377(1922). Of course, where the offense was committed under color of
office, the serviceman apparently has the right to have an action against
him removed to the federal district court. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (a) (1964);
See Duke & Vogel, supra note 286, at 454. Prior to the enactment of
the above statute, lower federal courts upheld the right of an accused
serviceman to be discharged from state custody where the offense was
committed while carrying out a lawful military order. See Lima v.
Lawler, 63 F. Supp. 446 (E.D. Va. 1945). See also In re Neagle, 135
U.S. 1 (1890).
290. See Girard, The Constitution and Court-Martial of Civilians
Accompanying the Armed Forces-A Preliminary Analysis, 13 STANr. L.
REV. 461, 477-78 (1961).
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the Constitution have the burden of persuasion. One must con-
cede, of course, that while the literal text of the Constitution
imposes limits on the range of choice available to the Court,
there is much room for judgment within those limits in most of
the cases before the Court.291 Even so, it is submitted that a fair
reading of the textual provisions relevant in O'Caflahan indi-
cates that the majority had the burden of persuasion. Another
persuasive reason for assuming that the majority had the burden
of persuasion is the unchallenged dicta in several previous
Supreme Court opinions which indicated that jurisdiction over
servicemen was based upon status.
The chief reliance of the majority was on English and
American constitutional history, and, as pointed out earlier,
the historical data is at best inconclusive. Yet this alone does
not totally refute the decision in O'Callahan. We are constantly
reminded by constitutional scholars that one of the strengths of
the Constitution is that it has the flexibility to provide answers
to new problems which could not have been foreseen by its
drafters.2 92 As Justice Holmes once said, "The case before us
must be considered in the light of our whole experience and
not merely in that of what was said a hundred years ago."2 93
Perhaps the majority could have made a case for a departure
from precedent by a careful examination of competing interests
in the light of present day realities. But in this crucial area
the majority opinion was most deficient.
One of the most striking aspects of the majority opinion is
the overbreadth exhibited in its treatment of the military jus-
tice system. An analysis of the military justice system is cer-
tainly pertinent in the context of the facts presented to the
Court, but the majority's discussion of this subject can fairly be
characterized as superficial and misleading. Although the ma-
jority grudgingly acknowledges some advances in the military
legal system, its tone is consistently hostile and condescending.
Courts-martial, according to the Court, "are singularly inept
in dealing with the nice subtleties of constitutional law."294 The
opinion continues, "[A] civilian trial... is held in an atmosphere
conducive to the protection of individual rights, while the mil-
itary trial is marked by the age-old manifest destiny of retribu-
291. Id. at 478.
292. Id. at 479-80; Hamiton, The Constitution-Apropos of Cross-
key, 21 U. Cur. L. REv. 79 (1953).
293. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
294. 395 U.S. at 265.
19691
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
tive justice." 295 It is probably true -that retribution is one aspect
of military justice. On the other hand, the majority's implicit
assumption that this infirmity is not shared by the civilian
criminal law system is hardly realistic.29 6 Moreover, such gen-
eralizations tend to obscure the rehabilitative and deterrent
functions served by the military justice system.297 Rather than
advancing meaningful analysis, these "sweeping dogmatic state-
ments 2 9 8 serve to obfuscate the more crucial problems raised
by O'Callahan.
An interesting contrast to the majority's largely negative
views on military justice is the statement of then Court of Appeals
Judge Warren E. Burger in a dissenting opinion in United States
ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy,29 9 where he referred to the
"universal recognition of the UCMJ as the most enlightened
military code in history and as [one] affording the basic elements
of fairness. 3 0 0  However one may view Chief Justice Burger's
assessment of the UCMJ, the majority's conclusions seem con-
siderably less than fair. To be sure, weaknesses still persist in
the military justice system.3 1  Command influence, for exam-
ple, continues to be a problem.302 At least at the general court-
martial level, however, the military accused enjoys procedural
rights roughly comparable, if not superior, to those enjoyed by a
civilian defendant in a federal criminal court. 30 3
Since the majority opinion emphasizes the value of the right
to grand jury indictment in the civilian courts, it is interesting
to examine comparable rights that are afforded members of the
armed services. Article 32 of the UCMJ affords the accused in
general courts-martial an investigation 30 4 analogous to the pre-
295. Id. at 266.
296. See, e.g., H. PACKER, THE LnmTs OF THE CanvmAL S, cTtoN
36-38 (1968); Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CON-
TEmp. PROB. 401 (1959).
297. See, e.g., Herrod, The United States Disciplinary Barracks Sys-
tem, 8 lm. L. REv. 35 (1960).
298. Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 Hirv. L. REv. 1, 3 (1957).
299. 259 F.2d 927 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
300. Id. at 940 n.29. Then Chief Justice Warren had a more reserved
but, nevertheless, favorable opinion of the 1JCMJ. See Warren, The Bill
of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181, 188-89 (1962).
301. See Quinn, Some Comparisons Between Courts-Martial and
Civilian Practice, 15 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 1240, 1258 (1968).
302. See, e.g., Johnson, Unlawful Command Influence: A Question
of Balance, 19 JAG J. 87 (1965).
303. Quinn, supra note 301, at 1242-43.
304. UCMJ art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964).
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liminary hearing and grand jury indictment in civilian courts3 0 5
The investigating officer is required to call all available wit-
nesses and to conduct a thorough and impartial investigation. 0 6
The accused is given a full opportunity to cross-examine wit-
nesses against him and to present any evidence in his own be-
half.30 ' He is entitled to obtain before trial, as a matter of
course, the substance of expected testimony of every witness
against him and information on every item of evidence in the
possession of the prosecution which may be used against him.308
These requirements arguably provide the accused substantially
greater pretrial discovery than federal rules provide a civilian
defendant.309 Although the civilian accused is entitled to cross-
examine and call witnesses at a preliminary hearing, the pri-
mary purpose is to determine whether there is sufficient evi-
dence to justify holding the defendant for a grand jury.3 10 More-
over, it is doubtful that the preliminary hearing provided for
under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was intended to
afford any substantial discovery rights to a defendant.31 In
addition, unlike an Article 32 investigation, the grand jury may
indict without affording the accused knowledge of the proceed-
ing or permitting him either to cross-examine witnesses against
him or to call witnesses in his favor.31 2 Finally, in many states
the prosecution bypasses the indictment and proceeds by infor-
mation. Failure to comply with Article 32, however, is grounds
for reversal.313
Not only does the UCMJ recognize in statutory form many
rights guaranteed to civilians through constitutional provisions,
but the United States Court of Military Appeals has ex-
panded the statutory protections by its own application of con-
stitutional principles to courts-martial. For example, that court
305. Bellen, The Revolution in Military Law, 54 A.B.A.J. 1194, 1195
(1968). Compare UCMJ arts. 30-34, 10 U.S.C. §§ 830-34 (1964) with
FED. R. Camn. P. 3-9.
306. MA rUAL I 34a at 7-9.
307. Id. f 34d at 7-11.
308. Quinn, supra note 301, at 1242.
309. Bellen, supra note 305, at 1195. See also Barber v. United
States, 142 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1944).
310. Bellen, supra note 305, at 1195.
311. Id.
312. See FED. R. CRi. P. 6d; Bellen, supra note 305, at 1196.
313. United States v. Nichols, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 119 (1957). One weak-
ness with the Article 32 investigation is that the convening authority
apparently need not accept the recommendation of the investigating
officer. See M rxuAL 35a at 7-12.
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has extended to servicemen the right to a speedy trial,3 14 the
right to confront witnesses,315 the right of protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures,3 18 the right to compulsory
process,31't the privilege against self-incrimination3 18 and the
right to a public trial.319 Not only has the Court of Military
Appeals adopted Miranda v. Arizona,3 20 which requires that the
accused be advised of his right to counsel during custodial in-
terrogation; the military has taken Miranda a step further by
making appointed counsel available to every serviceman at the
custodial interrogation stage without regard to whether he is an
indigent.321 In fact, the impact of Miranda on the military has
been less pronounced and less disruptive than on civilian law
enforcement agencies because the military had been accustomed
to advising a suspect of his right to remain silent.
3 22
O'Callahan, ironically, comes at a time when Congress has
been active in expanding and refining the rights of the accused
under the UCMJ. Thus, one of the usual justifications for
judicial activism, the failure of the legislative branch to meet
compelling needs,3 23 hardly seems applicable. The Military Jus-
tice Act of 1968,324 the most sweeping change in the UCMJ since
its enactment in 1950, makes military judges of general courts-
martial part of an independent judiciary, free from the potential
influence of local commanders, 325 and grants the accused in a
general court-martial the option in all noncapital cases to be
tried by a military judge alone, if the military judge approves.3 2
The prosecution has no power to veto the accused's request as
314. United States v. Schalck, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 371, 34 C.M.R. 151
(1964).
315. United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244
(1960).
316. United States v. Vierra, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 48, 33 C.M.R. 260 (1963).
317. United States v. Sweeney, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 599, 34 C.M.R. 379
(1964).
318. United States v. Kemp, 13 U.S.C.M.A. 89, 32 C.M.R. 89 (1962).
319. United States v. Brown, 7 U.S.C.N.A. 251, 22 C.M.R. 41 (1956).
320. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). This was accomplished in United States
v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
321. See Bellen, supra note 305, at 1195.
322. UCMJ art. 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1964); see United States v.
Wilson, 2 U.S.C.M.A. 248, 8 C.M.R. 48 (1953); Quinn, supra note 301,
at 1243.
323. See, e.g., Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person,
One Vote, One Value, 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 70.
324. 82 Stat. 1335 (1968).
325. 1 U.S. CODE, CONG. & AD. NEWS 1563 (1968).
326. Id. at 1561.
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it has in civilian practice.32 7 The military judge is also given
the power to rule finally on challenges on all questions of law
other than the issue of mental responsibility. 2 8 The 1968 Act
extends to defendants in special courts-martial the right, pre-
viously available only in general courts-martial, to have legally
qualified counsel appointed without a determination of in-
digency. 29 An accused in a special court-martial must now be
provided with legally qualified counsel unless such counsel can-
not be obtained because of "physical conditions or military
exigencies. ' 330  In contrast, few states and federal circuits re-
quire the appointment of counsel where the punishment is six
months' confinement or less.8 3 1 Finally, the 1968 Act gives the
accused the right to refuse trial by summary court-martial-the
equivalent of a civilian magistrate court332-- and instead request
a special court-martial. Thus, the chances are strong that an
accused will be represented by a lawyer without cost every time
he is faced with the possibility of punishment, however minor.33
Before overturning long standing jurisdictional standards,
it also would have been appropriate for the Court to analyze
and compare the governmental interests served by the existing
standard and the individual and governmental interests that
would be served by change. The opinion made no effort to do
this.384 Nowhere does Justice Douglas allude to the fact that the
United States has a substantial interest in preserving a high
degree of discipline, integrity, reputation and morale in the
armed forces. The fact that military offenders may be removed
from their stations renders military efficiency and operating
327. Mounts & Sugarman, The Military Justice Act of 1968, 55 A.B.
A.J. 470, 471 (1969).
328. 1 U.S. CODE, CONG. & An. NEws 1567 (1968).
329. UCMJ art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964).
330. 1 U.S. CODE, CONG. & AD. NEWS 1563 (1968). The exception is
narrowly limited to "rare circumstances such as on an isolated ship on
the high seas or in a unit in an inaccessible area, provided compelling
reasons exist why trial must be held at that time and at that place."
MAxmUALI 6c at 3-4-3-5.
331. Mounts & Sugarman, supra note 327, at 471-72.
332. 1 U.S. CODE, CONG. & AD. NEWS 1562 (1968).
333. The 1968 Act also substantially affects many other areas, such
as the right to bail pending appellate review, use of military judges in
special courts-martial and various aspects of appellate procedure. See
generalIy Mounts & Sugarman, supra note 327.
334. It is difficult to ascertain when the Court will "weigh" or "bal-
ance" governmental interests where there is a conflict between those
interests and an individual's exercise of arguably constitutional rights.
Compare United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), with United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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capability highly sensitive to the incidence of crime. When a
serviceman is detained by civilian authorities pending trial, or
is subsequently imprisoned, he is useless to his military unit.
On the other hand, as Justice Harlan pointed out, a serviceman
awaiting a court-martial may simply be restricted to limits, and
may participate in the military activity of his unit. Moreover,
although military reputation is in large measure an intangible
concept, a rape or murder by a serviceman in a civilian com-
munity probably damages the reputation of the armed forces in
that community to a greater degree than would a similar crime
committed within the confines of a military reservation. In
addition, the majority opinion fails to take into account the in-
terest of the military in the rehabilitation of offenders. Mil-
itary confinement facilities such as the Disciplinary Barracks at
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, operate retaining programs designed
to return offenders to honorable military service.3 3,5 To the ex-
tent, however, that under the O'Callahan test the offense is not
"service-connected," the accused may well be confined in a
civilian prison, where the rehabilitation program, if any, would
not be concerned with retraining for military purposes.
It should be pointed out that state authorities have the power
to try a military offender for violation of local laws notwith-
standing the military disposition of the case.338 To the extent,
then, that civilian authorities would choose to take jurisdiction,
the above arguments have less merit. As a practical matter,
however, civil authorities frequently waive jurisdiction where
the military desires to retain the accused in the military com-
munity. 37
The majority opinion fails to mention the fact that Congress
has quite recently reviewed the problem of court-martial juris-
diction over "civilian" offenses. In 1962, the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
considered the question of such jurisdiction and concluded that:
The subcommittee does not favor an outright prohibition of the
trial of civil offenses by court-martial, even if the prohibition
were to relate only to offenses committed in the United States
during peacetime. Such a prohibition would be difficult to ad-
minister, might in some instances act to the detriment of the
serviceman, and would place an undue burden on military au-
thorities in the performance of their duty to maintain dis-
cipline.338
335. See Herrod, supra note 297.
336. See text accompanying notes 288-89, supra.
337. Brief for Respondent at 28, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258
(1969).
338. Summary Report of Hearings by Subcomm. on Constitutional
[Vol. 54:1
COURT-MARTIAL JURISDICTION
The subcommittee points out that court-martial jurisdiction may
very well act to the benefit of the serviceman. For example,
servicemen are separated to a significant extent from the local
civilian community. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized
that "[t]he military constitutes a specialized community gov-
erned by a separate discipline from that of the civilian."3 09 Not
infrequently civilian communities may harbor racial or ethnic
bias against members of the military stationed nearby.340 For
example, a black serviceman stationed at a post located in the
southern part of the United States may very well prefer to be
tried by court-martial for the robbery of a white civilian mer-
chant than to be subjected to a local jury of his "peers."
Considered as a whole, the majority opinion is persuasive
only to those who were already persuaded. Faced with a prob-
lem involving many complex variables and requiring the deli-
cate balancing of competing interests, the Court responds with
dogmatic assertions about military justice. Faced with the re-
sponsibility of articulating a standard to guide those who must
live with the O'Callahan decision, the Court responds with a
two word test that only hints at the complex factors that will
have to be considered in deciding whether courts-martial have
jurisdiction to try particular cases.
Criticism of O'Callahan as a constitutional decision should
not be interpreted as acquiescence to the notion that the military
should try a serviceman for all offenses simply because of his
status as a member of the military. It reflects instead a belief
that the scope of court-martial jurisdiction over servicemen
should be defined by Congress rather than the Court. For exam-
ple, O'Callahan's counsel claimed in oral argument that the mil-
itary had tried a serviceman by court-martial for income tax
evasion.341 Mention was also made that courts-martial could be
used to prosecute servicemen for violation of the anti-trust
laws.342 At best, such offenses have only a remote effect on the
military. Although there is little actual evidence that the mil-
itary is using courts-martial in such areas, it may well be that
Congress should by statute prohibit the exercise of jurisdiction
with respect to these and perhaps other specific offenses. In
Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, Constitutional Rights of Militari
Personnel, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 27-26 (Comm. Print 1963).
339. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94 (1953).
340. Brief for Respondent at 31, O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S.
258 (1969).
341. 37 U.S.L.W. 3269 (1969) (summary of oral argument).
342. Id.
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any event, periodic review of the problem by Congress would be
appropriate.
VIII. CONCLUSION
One's first reaction upon reading O'Callahan is to assume
that it is both desirable and logical to limit court-martial juris-
diction to "service-connected" offenses. Yet when the decision
is examined in light of the realities of the military justice sys-
tem, there is good reason to conclude that O'Callahan may cause
serious problems without really advancing governmental or in-
dividual interests. In any event, the opinion is seriously inade-
quate both in terms of explaining the reason for the decision and
in providing guidance for those who must operate under the
"service-connected" test.
Several important issues will need to be resolved by the
Supreme Court in future cases. Absent a retreat from O'Cal-
lahan by the Burger Court, some clarification of the words "serv-
ice-connected" will be necessary, and it is submitted that only a
multi-factor approach will prove adequate to deal with the
numerous fact situations that will arise. It will be necessary
to resolve the issue of retroactivity, and a persuasive case can
be made for not applying O'Callahain retroactively. There is
much justification for the creation of a "petty offense" exception
to the "service connected" test. Finally, in order to ensure the
orderly working of the military appellate system, the exhaustion
of remedies requirement in habeas corpus cases should be estab-
lished as an adjunct to the O'Callahan principle.
EPILOGUE
Three decisions by the United States Court of Military Ap-
peals involving the application of O'Ca~lahan were handed down
after the completion of this article. In United States v. Borys343
the court reversed a court-martial conviction for rape, robbery,
sodomy, and attempts to commit such acts because the offenses
were civil in nature, occurred during the accused's off-duty hours
or when he was on leave, involved civilian victims, and were
committed while the accused was wearing civilian clothing and
driving his own private automobile. In United States v. Pra-
ther34 4 the court reversed a conviction for wrongful appropria-
tion of an automobile, robbing a gasoline station, and resisting
343. United States v. Borys, No. 21,501 (U.S.C.M.A. Sept. 5, 1969).
344. United States v. Prather, No. 21,603 (U.S.C.M.A. Sept. 5, 1969).
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arrest. The court found there was no service-connection since
the civil courts were open, the offenses did not occur on a mili-
tary post or an armed camp under military control, and did not
breach military security, flout military authority, or affect mili-
tary property. The court held in United States v. Beeker,345
inter alia, that possession of marijuana on a military installation
and use of marijuana either on or off a military installation
were service-connected because "the use of these substances has
'disastrous effects... on the health, morale and fitness for duty
of persons in the armed forces'."3 46
There was no discussion in any of the opinions of the issue
of retroactivity. Yet the application of O'Callahan without dis-
cussion of the issue of retroactivity is not a reliable guide to
the court's views on this issue since the three cases had not been
finally adjudicated prior to the decision in O'Callahan. Al-
though the Supreme Court held in Linkletter v. Walkers 7 that
Mapp v. Ohio 348 was not applicable to state court convictions
which had become final before rendition of Mapp, Mapp was
applied to cases still pending on direct review at the time it
was handed down. It would appear, therefore, that the question
of retroactivity of O'Caflahan is still open in the United States
Court of Military Appeals.
One final point is worthy of note. Chief Judge Quinn dis-
sented in both United States v. Borys3 49 and United States v.
Prather.350 One reason for his dissents was his assertion that
the jurisdictional limitations imposed by O'Callahan were not
applicable unless the offense in question was triable in a federal
court. He argued that a successful jurisdictional attack under
O'Caflahan must show not only that the crime is not service con-
nected, but also that a federal law makes the offense cognizable
in a federal civilian court. The pressures of time and space do
not permit a discussion of Chief Judge Quinn's lengthy defense
of this assertion. Suffice it to say that he was speaking in dis-
sent and that his construction of O'Callahan was rejected by
the other members of the court.
345. United States v. Beeker, No. 21,787 (U.S.C.M.A. Sept. 12, 1969).
346. Quoting from United States v. Williams, 8 U.S.C.M.A. 325, at
327, 24 C.M.R. 135 (1957).
347. 331 U.S. 618 (1965).
348. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
349. United States v. Borys, No. 21,501 (U.S.C.M.A. Sept. 5, 1969).
350. United States v. Prather, No. 21,603 (U.S.C.M.A. Sept. 5, 1969).
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